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ABSTRACT

TO THINE OWN SELF BE TRUE: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION
INTO THE ROLE OF SELF IN A MORAL DILEMMA

Patricia McCarthy Broderick
Center for Counseling and Family Studies
Liberty University, Lynchburg, Virginia
Doctor of Philosophy in Counseling

Moral identity was investigated phenomenologically as it was experienced both by those
who adhered to their stated moral convictions as well as those who did not. More
specifically, 16 adult, unmarried, pro-life women who had experienced an unwanted
pregnancy were interviewed, 8 of whom had carried and 8 had aborted. Significant
findings include the propensity of those who carried and aborted, alike, to view their
moral dilemmas through the filter of protection of self. Those who carried saw their
moral beliefs as serving their self-interests, but those who aborted did not. Connection
with a higher purpose was found in those who carried. A Moral Juncture Model of Self,
as conceptualized by the researcher, is presented.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Albert Bandura (2002) once asserted, “Almost everyone is virtuous at the abstract
level” (p.115); however, what is done in real life is often another matter entirely (Blasi,
1980). What one hypothetically considers the right thing to do in a moral dilemma is
often radically different from what one actually does when personally faced with that
exact moral dilemma (Krebs & Denton, 2005). Despite intensely held moral beliefs, the
movement from the impersonal “one ought” to the very personal “I should” is often quite
pronounced (Goodman, 2000). This gap between what one believes is the right thing to
do in a situation and what one actually does when faced with that situation remains
perplexing.
Why are some people who have very strong moral beliefs unable to live by them
while others are able to uphold their moral convictions despite the promise of substantial
personal sacrifice? Questions such as these have been pondered for centuries. For
example, Paul, a first century apostle of the early church, reflected on his personal
torment: “For I have the desire to do what is good, but I cannot carry it out. For what I do
is not the good I want to do; no, the evil I do not want to do – this I keep on doing” (Rom.
7:18-19, The Holy Bible, New International Version).
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Background to the Problem
Researchers have spent decades investigating the countless factors that determine
how people make moral decisions (Bandura, 1999; Bergman, 2002; Bersoff, 1999b;
Blasi, 1980; Colby & Damon, 1992; Denton & Krebs, 1990; Gilligan, 1977; Haidt, 2001;
Hoffman, 2000; Kohlberg, 1971; Milgram, 1974/2004; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Piaget,
1932/1969; Sykes & Matza, 1957). Piaget (1932/1969) conducted in situ observations of
children in the midst of unstructured play. Then through Kohlberg’s (1971) work, moral
development researchers took a radical move toward analysis of hypothetical dilemmas.
Only in the last thirty years have researchers begun to study the reasons why hypothetical
moral decisions frequently vary from the decisions one makes when faced with that same
dilemma in an authentic, personal situation (Bandura, 2002; Blasi 1980; Krebs & Denton,
2005).
Researchers have turned their attention to factors other than merely moral
reasoning to account for what influences actual moral (or immoral) behavior. Some of the
other factors found to significantly impact moral action include: (a) moral emotions
(Hoffman, 2000), (b) moral intuitions (Haidt, 2001), (c) moral motivations (Bersoff,
1999a), (d) the ability to rationalize (Sykes & Matza, 1957; Bandura, 1999; Tsang, 2002),
and (e) moral self-identity (Blasi, 1984).
Researchers have also focused their study on actual moral behavior by conducting
qualitative studies of societal moral exemplars in comparison with a control group of
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people with no exemplary standing in society (Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley
1995; Matsuba & Walker, 2005; McAdams, Diamond, de St. Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997;
Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Verplanken & Holland, 2002; Walker & Pitts, 1998).
Additionally, social psychologists have examined criminals and delinquents who defy the
moral standards set by society through laws (Straub, 2003). However, scant research
exists that identifies the factors that contribute to the failure to uphold one’s own moral
standards (Bandura, 1999, 2002; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, 1996). As
Joy (1983) aptly asserts, “Moral failure, too, belongs to the domain” of moral
development research, necessitating that the researchers delve into why one would revert
to “self-centeredness, and destructive, anti-just, immoral reasoning and behaving” (p. 58).
The challenge for the researcher is to find a real-world venue for the study of a selfdescribed moral failure as it compares with those in a similar situation who have upheld
their own moral beliefs.
The dilemma of an unwanted pregnancy has long been understood to generate
some of the most intense and weighty moral internal conflict in a woman’s world
(Coleman, Reardon, Strahan, & Cougle, 2005; Gilligan, 1977). Many researchers have
used unwanted pregnancies where abortion is legally sanctioned by the state as a
laboratory for studying moral decision-making (Foster & Sprinthall, 1992; Gilligan,
1982). Several studies indicated that those who hold negative attitudes about abortion
will have increased post-abortive psychological complications (Adler et al., 1990;
Conklin & O'Connor, 1995) as well as spiritual repercussions from their abortions
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(Trybulski, 2005). Recent polls show more than half of Americans label themselves as
pro-life (Ertelt, 2004). Therefore, an exploration into the moral decisions of pro-life
women in unwanted pregnancies is a culturally significant setting for studying factors
that influence moral decision making.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to investigate the moral self-identity as it was
experienced both by those who adhered to their own stated moral convictions as well as
those who did not. More specifically, the study targeted select pro-life women who had
experienced an unwanted pregnancy and explored how their perceptions of their own
moral self-identities influenced their decisions whether to carry their pregnancies to term.
The nature of this type of investigation, which sought to explore the significance of
morality to one’s self-identity within the experience of an actual moral dilemma, was best
examined using a phenomenological method of inquiry (Blasi, 2005; Blasi & Glodis,
1990, Kohlberg & Candee, 1984).

Research Questions
In this study, it was assumed that women who self-identify as being pro-life (to be
defined below) but chose to abort an unwanted pregnancy have made a decision that
violates their moral beliefs. Concomitantly, it was assumed that women who self-identify
as being pro-life and choose to carry their unwanted pregnancy to term have made a
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decision congruent with their moral convictions. Given these assumptions and taking into
account that the overarching objective of this study was to examine the extent to which
moral self-identities influenced the translation of moral beliefs into moral actions, the
following primary research questions framed this investigation:
1. How do select pro-life women describe their moral self-identities prior to an
unwanted pregnancy?
2. How do participants describe the impact of that pregnancy on their moral selfidentities?
3. What, if any, factors of their moral self-identity do participants identify as
influencing their decision to abort or to carry?

Definitions
Akrasia
The term akrasia was used in this study to refer to the inability to act in
accordance with one’s own sense of moral obligation or a failure to act with moral
integrity (Bergman, 2002). Akrasia was assumed in this study when pro-life women
chose abortion.

Morality
Morality is a code of conduct which defines right and wrong as accepted by a
society, a religion, or an individual for her own behavior (Gert, 2008). Morality in this
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study was operationally self-defined by the participants to eliminate the researcher’s bias
and to facilitate the study of actions either morally congruent or morally incongruent with
the participant’s own moral judgments. Therefore a moral decision, in this study, is one
that is congruent with the participant’s own moral judgment and an immoral decision is
defined as one that is not consistent with the participant’s own moral judgment.

Moral Agency
Moral agency can be exercised in both an inhibitive and a proactive manner.
Inhibitive refers to the perceived ability to refrain from immoral behavior and proactive
describes the self-assessment of one’s capability to behave morally (Bandura, 1999). This
study considered both aspects of moral agency expressed as the perceived capability to
reject abortion as well as the capacity to carry to term.
Moral Identity
Using Blasi’s (1983) “Self Model of Moral Functioning,” moral identity was
defined in this study as the extent to which morality is reflected as a central or essential
characteristic of an individual’s sense of self. Because of this, the terms “moral identity,”
“moral self,” “moral self-perception” and the more accurate term, “moral self-identity”
were used interchangeably.
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Moral Integration
Moral integration occurs, according to Blasi (1983) when moral judgment unites
with moral action and results in personal consistency. Moral integration was assumed in
this study when pro-life women chose to carry their unwanted pregnancies to term.
Pro-life
The question of what constitutes the definition of “pro-life” is debatable even in
pro-life circles. However, the accuracy of the definition was not of grave concern for the
purposes of this study. What was significant was an accurate understanding of whether
the participants in this study had violated or upheld their moral convictions. The
parameters used in this study to define the term, “pro-life” began with Werner’s (1993)
“Principled Pro-life” definition. Werner defined members of this principled pro-life
category as those who (a) describe the fetus as a person who is alive; (b) think abortion is
therefore the taking of a life; and (c) reject the benefits of abortion to the individual or
family, regardless of circumstance. Thorp and Wells (1995) recognized that most pro-life
physicians consider abortion justifiable if it preserves the life of the mother. Additionally,
Christian tradition has held that abortion to save a pregnant woman’s life is justifiable
(Jones, 2005). Consequently, this study classified those women who considered abortion
justifiable only if the continuation of a pregnancy threatened the physical life of the
mother as “pro-life”.
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Unwanted Pregnancy
For the purposes of this study, a woman who aborted her pregnancy and who was
not coerced to do so was assumed to have experienced an unwanted pregnancy (Adler et
al., 1992). A pregnancy carried to term was defined as “unwanted” if, at the point of
discovery, the mother (a) was unmarried and (b) claimed she did not want to be pregnant.

Locating Myself as a Researcher
In order to elevate the level of authenticity and trustworthiness in a qualitative
study, Creswell (1998) recommends that the researcher make possible sources of
preconception explicit by exposing “past experiences, biases, prejudices and other
orientations that have likely shaped the interpretation and approach to the study” (p. 202).
Certainly, my past and present experiences, beliefs, and passions deeply impacted my
interest in and consequently my choice of focus in this study. Therefore, in the spirit of
transparency, I will briefly discuss these areas of myself as they pertain to the research
topic.
I was raised in the home of a military officer where morality was constantly
emphasized. My selection of the United States Air Force Academy as my college of
choice speaks to my own comfort in living in an environment where honor and integrity
were highly treasured and enforced. In my first year as a cadet, I also became a follower
of Christ. This faith emphasizes the powerful moral code of honoring others above self as
was done by Jesus Christ for all humanity.
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My experience as a student at the Academy gave me my first exposure to
abortion. I heard that female cadets who became pregnant were quietly escorted
downtown for abortions because pregnancy and parenthood were grounds for dismissal
from the service academies. Although I have never experienced an abortion, I understood
how sexual incidents that occurred while at the Academy could have forced me into an
unwanted pregnancy. This would have required me to choose between aborting so I could
graduate or the more difficult path of becoming an unwed mother. Without a strong belief
structure about abortion, I am unsure what I would have chosen at that time.
The revelation that I could have chosen abortion compelled me to get involved
with helping women faced with crisis pregnancies to find ways to give their children life.
My Christian convictions, bolstered by education about fetal development, abortion
procedures, and the negative emotional and spiritual impact abortion can have on women
have led me to become pro-life. I was a volunteer counselor at pro-life pregnancy centers
for seven years and have financially supported them for the past twenty years.
Despite my Christian convictions, I recognize that, at times, I fail morally. Even if
I believe strongly that something is the right thing to do, I can allow fear, selfcenteredness, and pride to override my own moral convictions. Consequently, I have a
keen interest in the field of moral development and specifically, the difficulty one has in
actually doing that which one has decided is morally right. An exploration of my own
moral failures has resulted in an understanding that my own movement to self-
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centeredness is very natural, resulting in a daily struggle. Although I know the right thing
to do, I often fail to do it.
In essence then, this study is an extension of the study I have begun on myself.
Why do I undertake what is right when it is hard, but other times neglect carrying out
what is right even if it is an easy task? My hope was that in hearing the voices of those
who have betrayed themselves as I have at times, I would more readily recognize and
reject that propensity in myself. Likewise, I hoped that in listening to the voices of those
who have risen above their self-protective selves, I could do so myself.
Because of my deep involvement in the pro-life community, I understand gaps
often exist between what the pro-life community espouses and what they do when
personally faced with an unwanted pregnancy (Henshaw & Kost, 1996). Due to my
deeply held beliefs that abortion is harmful to both child and mother, I attempted to set
aside my judgment of what constitutes moral and immoral actions. By reporting the
experiences of women who were self-proclaimed pro-life prior to an unwanted
pregnancy, this becomes their pronouncement, rather than mine.

Significance of the Study
Although mankind makes moral decisions every day, Rest (1986) points out that
“moral behavior is an exceedingly complex phenomenon” (p. 18). The field of
psychology has used a variety of research settings in an attempt to gain understanding of
this multifaceted subject. Delinquency, or the violation of social norms has been used to
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study moral failure (e.g. Straub, 2003). Those chosen as social moral exemplars have
been investigated (e.g. Colby & Damon, 1992) and, in some cases, compared to those
who are not known for exemplary moral behavior (e.g. Hart & Fegley, 1995). In-depth
comparisons have been made between those viewed as morally courageous (e.g., rescuers
of Jews in Nazi Germany) and those who did not demonstrate such courage in the same
situation (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). However, little in-depth qualitative work has been
done to investigate the decisions of those who have violated personal moral values
compared to those who upheld theirs. This study was designed to help fill that gap.
The concept of moral identity has been hypothesized as an important bridge
between moral judgment and moral behavior (Blasi, 1984). Scant qualitative research has
been conducted to phenomenologically explore whether moral identity is the pivot point
(Goodman 2000) it has been theorized to be (Hardy & Carlo, 2005). To do this
adequately, a real-world venue for the study of the moral self as experienced by someone
who displayed moral integrity was needed to compare with those of someone selfdescribed as having failed morally.
The dilemma of an unwanted pregnancy in an environment where abortion is both
legal and available provides an appropriate setting to study intense personal moral
deliberations. However, in much of the literature, even when women assert they believe
abortion is wrong, the rightness or wrongness of the decision has often been ignored
(Blasi, 2004). The women in Gilligan’s study said things such as “I don’t believe in
abortions” (Gilligan 1982, p. 81); “It is taking a life” (p. 83) and “I have always thought
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abortion was a fancy word for murder” (p. 85). These women’s judgment of the
immorality of abortion was seemingly ignored by the researchers who treated all
decisions of a moral nature as “moral.” The design of this investigation accounted for the
women’s beliefs about the immorality of abortion by making that conviction the lens
through which their actions were viewed as adhering to moral convictions or
contradicting them. This study attempts to investigate, phenomenologically, the position
that moral self-identity holds in actual moral dilemmas.

Summary
Often a gap exists between what one believes is the right thing to do in a situation
and what one actually does. While qualitative studies usually have focused on violations
of society’s moral standards (Oliner & Oliner, 1988), little research has been conducted
to explore the experience of violating one’s own moral convictions or the experience of
adhering to those convictions in a similar situation. It has been proposed that one is more
likely to adhere to one’s moral convictions when one considers morality to be central to
self-identity (Blasi, 1983). This study of pro-life women who have experienced an
unwanted pregnancy provided fertile ground for the exploration of moral identity as it
influenced the capacity to hold to her stated moral convictions. The review of the
literature to follow frames the discourse, past and present, of theories and research
concerning the connection between moral reasoning and moral action.
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to review the existing literature in order to present
the theoretical discourse and applicable research pertaining to the relationship between
moral judgments and moral actions. In the literature, the relationship between moral
judgment and action has been a topic of myriad research and theorizing (Bandura 1999;
Blasi, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1993, 2004, 2005; Bergman, 2002; Bersoff, 1999a, 1999b:
Colby, 2002; Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Nunner-Winkler, 1993;
Rest, 1984; Walker, 2004). The cognitive-developmental movement, which brought
moral psychology into a field of its own and centered mostly on the realm of moral
reasoning or judgment, will open the discussion. Beyond the moral reasoning alone
approach, the review will follow the research as it made a practical move toward
theorizing and investigating the variables in the exposed gap between moral judgment
and action. The next section addresses the concepts and research of moral emotions and
intuition and how they inform the moral judgment–action gap. Then the research into
moral motivations and its subset, moral identity, will be presented, including the gaps in
the moral identity research. Finally, an overview of how the moral dilemma of an
unwanted pregnancy in a woman’s life has been used previously in the literature will be
discussed.
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Moral Reasoning
While playing games such as marbles with children and recording their
spontaneous remarks, Piaget (1932/1969) uncovered what he described as phases that,
“broadly speaking, follow one another without, however, constituting definite stages” ( p.
195). Through a series of naturalistic observations, Piaget recognized even young
children as philosophers who answered moral questions in ways very different from
adults. In young concrete-thinking children, morality was framed as an obedient response
to adults. However, older children, he noticed, had begun to internalize the consciousness
of good in an autonomous and reciprocal manner, initiating and expecting the give-andtake of moral norms in relationships independently. This type of development later gave
way to the “discipline of inner submission which is the mark of adult morality” (Piaget,
1932/1969, p. 404).
According to Piaget’s (1932/1969) formulation, children’s moral development is
best promoted through discussion among equals (cooperation) rather than constraint from
an authority (heteronomy). In the forward to his book on childhood moral development,
Piaget began with the disclaimer that it is the “moral judgment that we propose to
investigate, not moral behavior or sentimentality” (1932/1969, p.7). Through the
experience of cooperation, Piaget expected moral thought to develop from moral action.
Therefore, since he did not expect moral thought to precede moral action, he never
concerned himself with the dilemma of akrasia (Bergman, 2002). He wrote, “Thought
always lags behind action and cooperation has to be practiced for a very long time before
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its consequences can be brought fully to light by reflective thought” (Piaget, 1932/1969,
p. 64). In Piaget’s formulation, since moral thought developed from moral action, the
dilemma of akrasia was never addressed (Bergman, 2002).
Building on Piaget’s notion of the child as a philosopher, Kohlberg (1981)
conducted cross-cultural, longitudinal studies on children’s moral reasoning. In so doing,
he found what he called “universal levels of development in moral thought” (Kohlberg,
1981, p. 17) that he claimed could be defined independently of specific content. People
moved invariantly, in sequence, up the three levels and six stages, as described briefly
below (taken from Kohlberg, 1981):
1. Level I – Pre-conventional – Morality based on cultural rules and labels
a) Stage 1 – Punishment and Obedience Orientation
b) Stage 2 – The Instrumental Relativist Orientation
2. Level II – Conventional – Internalized Cultural Expectations
a) Stage 3 – The Interpersonal Concordance or “Good Boy-Nice Girl” Orientation
b) Stage 4 – Society Maintaining Orientation
3. Level III – Post-Conventional or Principled – Based on universal values and
principles apart from authority
a) Stage 5 – The Social Contract Orientation
b) Stage 6 – Universal Ethical Principles Orientation – Following self-chosen ethical
principles such as justice, human rights and respect for human dignity
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Moved by his proximity to the Holocaust and unwilling to kowtow to the valueneutral voice of social science, Kohlberg asserted that a philosophical underpinning must
be present to any talk of “moral” development (Walsh, 2000). Kohlberg (1971) argued
that his research revealed “justice” had proven to be the over-arching principle toward
which people morally develop, albeit at different paces and with different end-points.
Kohlberg’s method of evaluating the moral stages using hypothetical dilemmas generated
a series of research challenges. Although ample support for Kohlberg’s cognitivedevelopmental perspective existed (Blasi, 1980), troubling exceptions to his model
persisted as well.
Researchers demonstrated that moral judgment varies with the content of the
dilemma presented to or generated by participants in their studies (Krebs & Denton,
2005; Krebs, Vermeulen, Carpendale, & Denton, 1991; Walker, de Vries, & Trevethan,
1987). The research of Carpendale and Krebs (1992, 1995) also showed that the audience
of the reasoning affected the way one thought about moral issues. Similarly, work by
Denton and Krebs (1990) revealed that moral reasoning changed with the context of the
dilemma. Additionally, people often reasoned at higher Kohlbergian stages about abstract
moral dilemmas than they did about self-reported personal real-life dilemmas (Armon,
1995, 1998; Krebs & Denton, 2005). Each of these findings questioned Kohlberg’s
emphasis on the ability to reason at higher stages as the lone goal of moral development.
While Kohlberg is credited with making moral development its own field of
psychology, his original formulations apparently dismissed the question of whether this
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higher staged ability to structure moral cognitions in a universal, reciprocal manner
would lead to moral action. Kohlberg (1981) referenced the Platonic assumption that “He
who knows the good chooses the good” (p. 30). This assumption eventually displaced
Kohlberg’s theory from center stage of the moral psychology field to a supporting role,
but not without first igniting a firestorm of research.
The turning point in the direction of the moral development field seems to have
been ushered in by Blasi (1980). In his review of the literature, Blasi compared
Kohlberg’s stages of moral development with a variety of measures of real-life moral
actions including reported delinquency, descriptions of honesty, measures of conforming
activities, and altruistic behaviors. While concluding that moral reasoning is statistically
related to moral action, Blasi (1980) contended that the research does not support the
theory that those who reason at the higher Kohlbergian stages are more likely to uphold
their own reasoned moral standards. This problem of akrasia or the inability to act in
accordance with one’s own sense of moral obligation showed up in a variety of other
studies, challenging the central importance Kohlberg’s theory gives to moral reasoning
(Bergman, 2002).
Milgram’s (1974/2004) now-famous and equally controversial investigation
brought akrasia into the limelight. Milgram’s experiment included actors pretending to be
both test-takers and authorities administering the tests. The subjects of his experiment
were asked by the authority figures to shock test takers for wrong answers with feigned
volts of electricity. Although the majority of his subjects clearly saw disobedience of the
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authority figure by terminating the shocks as the morally right thing to do, very few
exhibited the courage to stop delivering the shocks (Milgram, 1974/2004).
Oliner and Oliner’s (1988) work further highlighted the problem of akrasia. They
compared those who rescued Jews from the Holocaust with those who had opportunity to,
but did not get involved. Although they were not studying moral reasoning per se, Oliner
and Oliner (1988) found that only 11% of rescuers were motivated to action by their
reasoned principles.
Gilligan’s (1982) interviews of 29 women facing the abortion dilemma further
substantiated the presence of akrasia in actual moral reasoning. Although not directly
addressed by Gilligan, her anecdotal transcripts document a gap between these women’s
theoretical moral reasoning about the morality of abortion and their behavior. Gilligan’s
(1982) interviewees used phrases such as “I am saying that abortion is morally wrong,
but the situation is right, and I am going to do it” (p. 86), and “I have always thought
abortion was a fancy word for murder….but I am doing it because I have to” (p. 85).
These quotes point to a marked disconnect between these women’s reasoning about the
morality of abortion versus their actions in an unwanted pregnancy.
Foster and Sprinthall (1992) found a similar gap between reasoning ability and
actual reasoning in a moral dilemma. They queried young women, ages 12 to 25, who
had come to a health care facility to abort their pregnancies. Foster and Sprinthall (1992)
found that regardless of age, the women reasoned at a lower Kohlbergian stage when
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determining what to do about their own abortions than they reasoned on the hypothetical
dilemmas.
Colby and Damon’s (1992) research furthered the understanding of the moral
reasoning-action disconnect. In their study, 23 moral exemplars were picked by a panel
of “expert nominators” for possessing all the characteristics of a highly moral person
(committed to morality, possessing moral integrity, selfless, inspirational, and humble).
In testing Kohlberg’s moral stages of these exemplars who were known to live
exceptionally moral lives, Colby and Damon (1992) discovered that only half of them
reasoned at the higher stages (four to five) while the other half reasoned at stages three
and four. This lent further credence to the notion that one does not need to reason at high
levels to act morally.
More recently, studies with adolescents have shown a similar gap between
reasoning and action. Hart and Fegley (1995) found 15 adolescent “care exemplars” who
participated in helping behaviors in the community exhibited no higher levels of moral
judgment than those in a control group of adolescents who were not known for their
participation with helping behaviors. Conversely, in their exploration of 278 adolescents,
Leenders and Brugman (2005) found that scores of those who obtained low Kohlbergian
measures of moral judgment were not predictive of reported delinquent behavior.
Many researchers still claim that moral reasoning is a necessary component of
moral action (Blasi, 1999; Bergman, 2002; Hoffman, 2000; Rest, Narvarez, Bebeau, &
Thoma, 1999). Other researchers, however, have begun developing more comprehensive
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theories involving other elements that moderate the relationship between moral reasoning
and behavior. Moral character had long been abandoned by the field of psychology
because of the confusion and uncertainty surrounding a theoretical basis for the concept,
as well as the propensity to reduce moral character to nothing more than a bag of
disputable virtues (Blasi 2005). The concept of moral character has recently been
revitalized in a project by Lapsley and Power (2005); however, the differentiation of
moral character from moral identity in this project remains conceptually vague (Blasi,
2005). The most well-researched and conceptually clear moderators between moral
reasoning and moral action appear to be moral emotions (Hoffman, 2000), moral intuition
(Haidt, 2001), moral motivation (Power, 2005), and moral identity (Blasi, 1983, 1984,
1993, 1995, 2004).

Moral Emotions
Although Kohlberg’s work was guided by the assumption of cognitivism, he
recognized human affect plays an important role in moral reasoning as well (Kohlberg &
Candee, 1984). He contended that emotions, such as sympathy, indignation, concern and
guilt needed the structure of objective cognitive perspective-taking operations to be a
positive addition to one’s moral development. Indeed, the studies that Batson and his
colleagues (Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995) at the University of Kansas
conducted on their students seem to support Kohlberg’s assertion. They found empathyinduced altruism that has a goal of helping the one to whom empathy is felt can be
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independent of the moral principles of justice. Specifically, when their students felt
empathy for a particular individual, they were willing to over-ride their own beliefs of
what constitutes fairness and allocate preferential help for that individual.
Colby and Damon’s (1992) study recognized the importance of empathy to the
moral exemplars that they interviewed. Oliner and Oliner (1988) likewise noticed more
empathy in those who risked personal safety to rescue the Jews from the Nazis than the
non-rescuers. Although both studies were correlational, empathy seems to be related to
moral behaviors. Similarly, Kagan (1997) found that some individuals have
temperaments which naturally produce more frequent and intense moral emotions. What
remains unknown is how much of the tendency toward moral emotions is attributable to
temperament and how much is learned.
Blasi (1999) took a detailed look at the role of emotions in moral motivation. His
contention was that if emotions are motivators of behavior and if the regulation of
emotion is largely shaped by individual automatic mechanisms or classical conditioning,
then they can be trusted as a sincere, objective expression of the attitudes of the person.
According to Blasi, even though emotions occur involuntarily, they are similar to
intentional actions, in that they reveal one’s desires and beliefs about a situation.
Additionally, Blasi asserted that emotions can be shaped reflexively as they are
experienced and consequently owned as appropriate or rejected as inappropriate to one’s
perception of oneself. For Blasi, emotions such as empathy are not moral unless they are
regulated intentionally toward specifically moral ends, or if they are a spontaneous
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response to pre-existing moral concerns. In Blasi’s formulation, it is prudent for the
researcher to inquire about the emotions surrounding an event as an objective indication
of that individual’s “personal norms” (Blasi, 1999, p. 15).
In her review of the literature concerning the role of emotions and emotion-related
regulation in moral functioning, Eisenberg (2000) agreed with Blasi’s (1999) theories
about moral emotions. Her review suggested that moral emotion can motivate both moral
and immoral behaviors. Additionally, those emotions can serve to communicate one’s
moral values and concerns to the self and others. Eisenberg (2000) identified guilt as the
quintessential moral emotion, but discussed shame and empathy as being other wellresearched emotions. In addition, Eisenberg’s review found non-moral emotions such as
anger, frustration, fear, and general temporary mood can impact moral functioning.
Hoffman (2000) also worked with moral emotions to formulate a theory of
empathy and guilt development. In light of his study of prosocial moral behavior, he
recognized the importance of these emotions to moral development. However, he also
recognized the limitations of moral emotions to guide moral behavior and has labeled
those he found in his research as “empathic over-arousal,” “familiarity bias” and “hereand-now” bias. Empathic over-arousal can cause one to become so distressed that the
person moves out of empathic mode entirely. Familiarity bias occurs when a person
empathizes with family, friends and others similar to oneself more than those who are
different. A here and now bias occurs when a person favors people in close proximity
who present themselves as victims.
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Because moral emotions can lead to both immoral and moral behavior, Hoffman
(2000) contended, much like Kohlberg (1971), that a comprehensive theory of moral
development requires moral principles. According to Hoffman, empathy is “mutually
supportive” (p. 225) with the principle of caring and provides a motive to remedy
violations to the principle of justice. However, Hoffman also conceded that empathy and
guilt may well be the response of those motivated to uphold the principles of justice and
care. Hoffman’s extensive work with moral emotions pointed to the controversial nature
of the role that human affect plays in promoting moral action.
Moral Intuition
Closely related to the research concerning moral emotions is Haidt’s (2001) social
intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Moral intuition is defined by Haidt as: “The
sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence
(good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps
of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (p. 818). Moral reasoning is,
in the moral intuitionist’s paradigm, relegated to searching for an argument to support a
decision that has already been made. Haidt likens the intuitionist’s reasoning to the
arguments of a lawyer defending a client rather than a scientist seeking truth. Therefore,
according to Haidt, emotions such as love, empathy, guilt and remorse, as well as
intuitions, provide a much greater influence on moral behaviors than objective thoughts
about the matter.
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The moral intuitionist’s theory is supported by the research of Bargh and
Chartrand (1999). They covertly primed their participants with mental representations.
This unconscious priming had the same effect on the subjects’ behavior as explicit and
intentional directions. Whether self-intended or placed there by others, the source of the
representations was inconsequential. Bargh and Chartrand (1999) concluded that most
mental processes are automatic, effortless, fast, and are either naturally formed or have
developed out of repeated and consistent experience.
Haidt’s (2001) assertions in his social intuitionist theory opened a floodgate of
criticisms. Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004) argued that although behaviors may be
undertaken automatically, this does not necessarily indicate that they “originated and
developed automatically” (p. 279). They contended that Haidt confuses the causes given
to explain behavior, with reasons given to justify the judgment as being morally correct.
Despite these concerns about the intuitionist theory, many have begun to recognize the
non-verbal and intuitive aspect of moral decision-making in moral judgments (Narvaez &
Bock, 2002; Colby, 2002). Like moral emotions, Narvaez and Lapsley (2005) assert that
moral intuitions can be trained, educated or developed similar to the ways experts train
themselves to have automatic responses based upon important clues. Moral intuitions and
emotions, according to Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004), can be a reflection of an
iterative, developmental process combining reasoning, experiences and intuitions,
providing an objective insight into one’s moral motivations.
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Moral Motivation
A situation where one knows the moral thing to do but lacks the motivation to
follow through with it, is easy to conceive (Hardy & Carlo, 2005). The concept of moral
motivation attempts to answer the question posed by the existence of akrasia, “Why is
one unable to act according to one’s own sense of moral obligation?” Power (2005)
defined moral motivation simply “as a part of a desire for the good” (p.197), but later
qualified his definition by requiring that moral motivation be “based on a recognition that
one is acting in accord with one’s moral duty or sense of what is morally right” (p. 203).
Nunner-Winkler (1993) further clarified the motivation toward morality by
defining it as a second-order desire. According to Nunner-Winkler, first-order desires are
immediate or spontaneous needs or wishes, such as a desire for sweets. Second-order
desires are those that are chosen with some deliberation, often regulating first order
desires, such as a desire to eat in a healthy manner. Nunner-Winkler (1993) contends that
the motivation to act morally or to be a person of high moral character constitutes a
second order desire. For a motivation to be moral it must be aligned with one’s sense of
moral duty or what is right. However other motivations, such as empathy, can prompt one
to act. According to Nunner-Winkler, moral duty acts “as a filter through which other
motives must pass” (p. 284).
Along with this internal obligation arising from the individual’s conscience,
Power (2005) recognizes a sense of duty that spawns from identification with the
community. Expanding on Kohlberg’s “just-community” approach, Power contends that
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along with experiencing accountability for community norm violations, individuals
experience “collective responsibility” (p. 220). These are motivations that develop out of
a sense of attachment to the community as a whole.
Identification with one’s community is not the only influence that researchers
have found can increase one’s sense of moral motivation. Hoffman (2000) points to
empathy and guilt as emotions that consistently act as motivators to moral behavior.
Hardy and Carlo (2005) agree with Hoffman that moral emotion can be a primary source
of moral motivation and often is the “‘spark’ that leads to action” (p. 233). Hardy and
Carlo contend, however, that Hoffman overstates the role of moral emotion. They can
conceive of a situation where one believes a course of action is right, is emotionally
motivated to take that course of action, but does otherwise. This lends credence to the
presence of other moderating factors in addition to moral reasoning and emotion.
Bandura (1999, 2001) posited that one’s sense of moral agency could provide a
motivation to do what one believes is morally right. According to Bandura (1999), moral
agency has dual aspects – inhibitive and proactive - where inhibitive refers to one’s
perceived ability to refrain from immoral behavior and proactive describes the selfassessment of one’s capability to behave morally. Power (2005) asserts that spirituality
can contribute to one’s sense of agency by creating a “perception of a supramoral self
that draws its sense of moral agency from a power beyond the self” (p. 237).
Additionally, Power claims that spirituality can motivate moral action by changing the
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way individuals perceive themselves and their world, as well as by adding religiously
motivated weight to their moral reasoning.
Krebs and Denton (2005) took a much more cynical approach to religion as the
basis of moral motivation:
All societies attempt to persuade people that behaving morally will pay off in the
end, because, for example, there will be a final reckoning that will determine
whether they reside eternally in heaven or in hell. However, false promises tend to
lose their power when they are exposed as invalid. (p. 646)
Building on Piaget’s (1932/1969) idea of cooperation as the ideal moral motivation,
Krebs and Denton suggest that people can be motivated to act cooperatively rather than
immorally when they believe that they will reap greater benefits by doing so. Although
openly dismissive of religion’s contribution to moral motivation, Krebs and Denton’s
(2005) pragmatic approach to morality realistically recognizes that there are competing
motivations to the desire to be moral.
Competing Motivations
Colby (2002) recognized that common sense, more than research, teaches that
regardless of one’s level of sophisticated moral reasoning, one can be motivated toward
desires other than morality. Walker (2002) supports Colby’s assertion with his definition
of moral motivation as the prioritizing of “moral values over competing values and
concerns” (p. 355). Hoffman (2000) contended that moral acts cannot be read as simple
expressions of one’s moral motives. Rather, actions are the result of one’s attempts to
balance egoistic and moral motivations. According to Bargh and Chartrand (1999), one’s
judgments, decisions, and behavior are accurately viewed as indicators of the goals one is
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presently pursuing. These may or may not be moral goals and are often subconscious.
This is in keeping with Freud’s (1930/1961) “pleasure principle” which recognized that
man is motivated, often subconsciously, to seek pleasure and to avoid pain.
The avoidance of pain can be a powerful motivating factor. Straub (2005), whose
work had him examining the psychological origin of mass murders, genocide, and other
forms of immoral human destruction, recognized the propensity toward hostility and
aggression was often motivated by the frustration of one’s basic psychological needs.
Likewise, he asserts that fulfillment of these needs (for security, positive identity,
effectiveness, control, relationships, autonomy, comprehension of reality, satisfaction,
and transcendence of the self) provides fertile ground for growth of altruistic behaviors.
In a similar vein, Sykes and Matza (1957), found in their work with delinquents, that
“deviation from certain norms may occur not because the norms are rejected, but because
other norms, held to be more pressing or involving a higher loyalty, are accorded
precedence” (p. 669).
In his review of research studying subjects motivated to act morally, but unable to
do so, Bersoff (1999b) hypothesizes that when other life goals outweigh one’s desire to
be moral, self-serving interests succeed in controlling behavior. According to Bersoff, all
that needs to be done is to convince oneself that one is the exception to the rule in order
to justify fulfilling self-interests. Krebs and Denton (2005) asserted, “Selfishness and
self-serving biases may well be a more formidable enemy of morality than low-stage
moral reasoning” (p. 646).
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Batson and his colleagues at the University of Kansas have gone one step further
by claiming from their research that rather than being motivated to be moral, most people
are motivated to appear moral while serving self-interests (Batson, Kobrynowicz,
Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, &
Strongman, 1999; Batson, Thompson, & Chen, 2002). Through a series of eight studies,
Batson and colleagues continually found more evidence of what they termed, “moral
hypocrisy” than participants demonstrating moral integrity. They concluded that when
being moral involves personal cost, a person’s motivation to be truly moral is often overpowered by one’s motivation to serve self-interests. Batson et al. (2002) also noted that
the charades undertaken by participants to appear moral to themselves were extensive.
Consequently, appearing moral was important even when they knew they were being
immoral. This finding supports Tsang’s (2002) assertion that the rationalizations of
immoral behavior, ironically, are driven by the high importance one places on moral
standards and the need to appear moral to oneself. The self-condemnation associated with
acting immorally leads one to reinterpret the act as moral by using rationalizations or
neutralizations.
Neutralizations
Much has been written about the mental gymnastics involved in making immoral
behavior palatable to oneself. Although often used interchangeably in the literature,
neutralizations are considered to be the thoughts used to justify an immoral act that one is
planning to commit without seeming immoral to the self (Sykes & Matza, 1957); on the
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other hand, rationalizations are the cognitive processes one goes through after the
violation of a moral standard to convince oneself that the action was not immoral (Tsang,
2002). Ground-breaking neutralization theory work developed largely within the context
of delinquency research by Sykes and Matza (1957), helped explain many types of normcontradicting behavior (Fritsche, 2002). The five major neutralization techniques their
research identified were: (a) denying responsibility such as asserting that the action was
accidental or outside one’s control; (b) denying injury, such as believing that no great
harm was caused; (c) denying the victim, by asserting that the injury was not wrong in
light of the circumstances or that no one suffered; (d) condemning the condemners, by
rejecting or minimizing those who disapprove of the behavior; and (e) appealing to
higher loyalties, by claiming there is someone who demands greater loyalty than the
society who formed the norms.
Bersoff (1999a) studied neutralization techniques among participants who were
purposefully overpaid. He found that it took only subtle disruptors to derail the
neutralization process used to justify accepting overpayment. Additionally, he noted that
the less ambiguous the situation, the harder it was for participants to justify the unethical
behavior. Bersoff (1999a) further concluded from his study that when one uses
neutralizations to further one’s self-interests, those neutralizations will be effective only
as far as they are believable to the self.
Bandura (2002) proposed a theory of moral disengagement, whereby people who
feel motivated to violate their own moral standards, disengage their normal self-
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sanctions. He described cognitive manipulations which allow one to justify immoral
behavior as: (a) euphemistic labeling to provide a language that sanitizes cruel behavior;
(b) advantageous comparisons of the self to others who are more morally corrupt; (c)
displacement of responsibility, minimizing one’s agency and responsibility; (d) diffusion
of responsibility leading to collective action and anonymity; (e) disregard or distortion of
consequences; and (f) the dehumanization of the victim. Bandura contends that these
methods of disengagement are used to neutralize self-censure and to preserve self-esteem.
Bandura (2002) described the differences between individuals who maintain their
own moral standards and those who are unable to keep such moral integrity. He asserted
that the differences are not found in the ability to reason morally at the abstract level, but
how easily one can use these disengagement techniques quickly and effectively in real
life. Whether one refers to neutralization techniques, rationalizations, or disengagement
techniques, it seems evident that an internal drive to maintain a positive moral selfperception exists. Recognition that the self is central to the ability to live by one’s own
moral standards has produced a spate of research regarding moral identity. Since moral
motivations ultimately stem from the perceptions and priorities of the self, for the
purposes of this study, the focus was on moral self-identity.
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Moral Identity
Early Moral Identity Research
The concept of moral identity springs, in part, from Festinger’s (1957) Theory of
Cognitive Dissonance. This theory holds that individuals strive for consistency within
themselves, between their thoughts and actions. To Festinger, the existence of dissonance
(or inconsistency) motivates one to reduce that dissonance by avoiding situations or
information that would increase that inconsistency. Festinger further states that “a fear of
dissonance would lead to a reluctance to take action – a reluctance to commit oneself.
Where decision and action cannot be indefinitely delayed, the taking of action may be
accompanied by a cognitive negation of the action” (p. 31). After a series of studies,
Festinger concluded that the “tolerance of dissonance” (p. 267) varies from person to
person. For some, dissonance is extremely painful and intolerable; for others, life
contains more gray areas, making dissonance easier to tolerate.
In their comparison of rescuers with those who did not rescue the Jews in Nazi
Europe, Oliner and Oliner (1988) found that the moral self provided the filter for action
or inaction. The rescuers in their study were more expansive through strong attachment to
others, but non-rescuers were more constricted and detached from the Jews and their
plight. Rescuers’ sense of obligation to help arose largely from internal belief structures
that valued the lives of others and the anticipation of guilt or shame if one failed to act.
Rescuers, they found, displayed a strong sense of personal integrity and care within their
own value systems.
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Similarly, in their study of moral exemplars, Colby and Damon (1992) found that
moral excellence required personal integrity or a commitment to consistently translate
moral principles into moral action, regardless of the personal cost. Colby and Damon
concluded that exemplars exhibited an inner harmony that seemed to unite self and
morality, so much so that their decisions to act were almost no decisions at all. The moral
exemplars perceived that they had no choice but to live by their moral commitments.
These findings caused Colby and Damon to conclude, “Where there is perceived
concordance between self and morality, there will follow direct and predictable links
between judgment and conduct as well as great certainty in the action choices that result”
(p. 304).
Blasi’s Self Model of Moral Functioning
Blasi (1983) was the first to propose that the moral self and particularly, moral
identity, could fill the akrasia gap between moral judgment and functioning. His
contention was that “self-consistency is the motivational spring of moral action” (Blasi,
1993, p.99). Blasi has been systematically honing his “Self Model of Moral Functioning”
(hereby also known as the “Self Model”) for more than two decades (1983, 1984, 1993,
1995, 2004). Blasi claimed that self-identity is the central concept in understanding moral
functioning as it relates moral cognition to moral behavior. The three basic components
of his model include (a) the importance of moral self, (b) personal responsibility for
moral action, and (c) self-consistency (Walker, 2004). The first of these three
components, the moral self, is conceptualized by Blasi as how central people value
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morality in their awareness of their core selves. The moral self, Blasi contends, speaks to
the “significance and salience” (Walker, 2004, p. 2) of moral values to the core selfidentity.
The second central component of the Self Model is the extent to which one feels
personally responsible for moral action (Blasi, 1983). For Blasi, the formation of a moral
judgment is insufficient to move one to act morally unless one also is convicted of a
moral obligation to undertake (or refrain from) that action. It is this sense of moral
responsibility that implicates the self as the agent accountable for the moral action.
The third central component of the Self Model is what Blasi (1983) calls selfconsistency or integrity. Initially, Blasi conceptualized moral integrity as a motivational
force that prompts the self to act in alignment with one’s own moral judgments. If that
alignment does not occur, then Blasi contended that neutralization techniques would be
required to alleviate the inconsistency within oneself. Later, Blasi (2004) clarified that
there are many motivational forces that propel one to action. Some are personal or nonmoral values rather than moral. However, there are only a few values in one’s sense of
self that can be classified as core values and these are particularly important to creating
the essence of a being. For Blasi (2004), to truly be oneself is to live out core ideals.
According to Blasi (1993), only with these components of the moral self in mind
can the notion of moral self-betrayal be conceptualized. The thoughts and emotions
associated with a sense of self-betrayal require that one feel responsible for one’s
identity. Blasi and Glodis (1990) attempted to measure moral self betrayal in women by
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asking each of them to identify an ideal that was very important to her sense of self. Then
six to ten weeks later the women were encouraged to envision themselves taking part in
activities hand-selected to contradict their previously self-stated ideals. Moral selfbetrayal was evaluated by using the following scales: positive emotion, conflict, strong
negative emotion, reference to ideal, practical reasons, moral and altruistic reasons, and
self-inconsistency.
Blasi and Glodis (1990) found two distinct patterns in the group of women: one
group seemed content to focus on the pragmatic consequences of the decision, while the
other group felt deep regret at violating their values. The pragmatic group expressed
relief and satisfaction in their decision, even though the decision went against their stated
ideals. The regretful group voiced neither positive feelings nor pragmatic justifications.
They viewed their assigned deeds as serious contradictions to their ideals, resulting in
feelings of shame, guilt, and depression. The researchers concluded that expressions of
self-betrayal were indications that the ideals were more central to the women’s core sense
of self.
Recent Moral Identity Research
Several studies have been conducted to test the validity of the moral identity
construct and its impact on moral behavior. Hardy and Carlo (2005) conducted a review
of the literature prior to 2005 and concluded that Blasi’s (1983) conception of moral
identity as a source of moral motivation was generally validated. The studies which
focused on adolescents and adults generally supported the notion that those who held

35

moral values and virtues as an important part of their self-concept also were more
engaged in pro-social behaviors.
What was not clear to Hardy and Carlo (2005) in their review, is the direction of
causality between moral identity and moral behavior. In fact, a two-year longitudinal
study by Pratt, Hunsberger, Pancer, and Alisat (2003) comparing adolescents’ moral
identity with their involvement with community helping activities indicated that the
volunteer activities preceded endorsement of moral values for the self, and not the other
way around. In a similar finding, Matsuba and Walker (2005) solicited stories from
adolescent moral exemplars, and noted that most narratives included an early exposure
and involvement with the suffering of others.
Early exposure to others’ suffering was a theme supported in Colby and Damon’s
(1992) moral exemplars, as well as Oliner and Oliner’s (1988) study of the rescuers of
Jews in Nazi Europe. Oliner and Oliner (1988) describe a catalyst as an external event
that challenged the rescuers they studied, causing them to internalize the needs of others
and compelling them to become involved. Haste and Locke (1983) refer to a triggering
event as an occurrence that creates a powerful emotional response which triggers a
reexamination of one’s life choices, moral perspective, and sense of social responsibility.
The necessity of some form of activation found in the literature lends credibility to the
second component of Blasi’s (1983) model of the moral self, that of personal
responsibility.
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The responsibility component of Blasi’s Self Model was further bolstered by
Verplanken and Holland ‘s (2002) research. In a series of six studies looking into the
value-behavior link, they found two components necessary for values to affect behavior:
the value must be central to the self and the values had to be cognitively activated in
order to guide behavior. The value-activation manipulations that Verplanken and Holland
used only worked when the value was central to the self, lending credibility to the
importance of the self in the value-behavior relationship. However, having moral values
as central to the self was not sufficient to motivate congruent behavior without activation
of those values. A responsibility to uphold those values was needed as well.
Aquino and Reed (2002) conducted a series of six studies designed to investigate
the construct of moral identity further. First they designed and validated a measure of
moral identity that identified nine traits that a moral person possesses: care, compassion,
fairness, friendliness, generosity, helpfulness, diligence, honesty, and kindness. Then they
compared those claiming a strong moral self-identity with actual donation behaviors, and
found second to gender (girls gave 2.33 times more than boys), students who strongly
internalized moral identity were more likely to donate food to the poor. Additionally, the
results revealed two dimensions of the self-importance of moral identity, one private
(internalized) and one public (symbolic). Aquino, Reed, Thau, and Freeman (2007)
attempted to examine the role that the moral self-concept plays in moral disengagement.
They found that participants in whom morality occupied an important position in the selfconcept were less likely to use disengagement techniques to support brutality in war.
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The concept of moral identity as a motivator toward moral behavior has come
under some scrutiny. Nucci (2004) contends that the idea that a moral action is primarily
motivated by one’s desire for self-consistency is mechanistic and reductionistic, ignoring
the complex contextualizations involved in many moral decisions. Nisan’s (2004)
research agrees with this assessment. In describing the difference between a moral
judgment and moral choice Nisan (2004) states,
When a person confronts a situation in which he identifies a moral problem, he
carries out two judgments – one regarding the right behavior in this situation,
from a pure moral standpoint relying exclusively on moral standards, and the
other an all things considered judgment that he will actually adopt (p.148).
In Nisan’s formulation, the moral choice, rather than the moral judgment is more closely
linked with identity – it “reflects the person’s identity, values, and commitments that are
important to him, without which he is not himself” (p. 156). Blasi (2004) responds by
asserting that it is the hierarchical ordering of these contextual inputs present in every
moral decision (needs, desires, values, traits, and life events) that determine what one’s
core commitments are. Therefore, how one orders these inputs reflects the relative
importance and centrality of morality to the self.
Limitations to Moral Identity Research
In their review of the literature, Hardy and Carlo (2005) admit to being puzzled as
to why there has been extensive theorizing about, but little research directed toward
moral identity. Perhaps, they surmise, it is due to the abstract and complex nature of
moral identity. Regardless of the reasons, there are notable limitations to the research
concerning the moral self. Although the qualitative designs used by Oliner and Oliner
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(1988) as well as the interviews of moral exemplars by Colby and Damon (1992)
identified moral identity as a recurring theme in their research, these research projects
were limited to the study of individuals who were moral exemplars or failures in the eyes
of someone other than themselves.
Batson and colleagues (1997, 1999, 2002), conducted quantitative studies to
expose moral hypocrisy and found that participants violated their own moral standards.
However, in-depth experiential interviews of participants who have violated their own
self-identified, strongly held moral beliefs, have yet to be conducted. Additionally, in
their review of the research directed at understanding moral identity, Hardy and Carlo
(2005) note that little has been done to study moral identity in morally prohibitive
situations where inaction rather than action is the morally ideal action.

Abortion as a Moral Decision
Bandura (2002) recognized that the study of morality using abstract principles in
“decontextualized and depersonalized circumstances” (p. 115) renders almost everyone
as virtuous. However, the choices one makes in real world decisions are much more
indicative of one’s moral fabric. Abortion has long been recognized as a contentious
public moral topic, as well as a hotbed of intense personal moral deliberation.
Gilligan (1977) has described all judgments about the moral dilemma of an
unwanted pregnancy as part of the moral domain. Specifically, she recognized that,
“When a woman considers whether to continue or abort a pregnancy, she contemplates a
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decision that affects both self and others and engages directly the critical issue of hurting”
(Gilligan, 1977, p. 491). In her book developed from her research, Gilligan quotes
naturalistic interviews of women in the throes of the abortion decision in an attempt to
lend credence to her theory that women’s moral reasoning is constructed of “caring” or
relational themes that are overlooked in Kohlberg’s “justice” framework of moral
development. In her analysis of the voices of women making the decision whether or not
to abort, however, she seemingly overlooked the moral judgments of the women
themselves. Many of the women began their discussions of the conflicts and reasoning
behind their decisions to abort with their own moral pre-judgments about abortion such
as “I don’t believe in abortions” (Gilligan 1982, p. 81); “It is taking a life” (p. 83); and “I
have always thought abortion was a fancy word for murder” (p. 85), then went on to
describe why they had the abortion anyway.
When Broen, Mou, Bodtker and Ekeberg (2005) looked at the reasons Norwegian
women chose to abort, their findings supported many previous studies that identified
educational, vocational and financial concerns, as well as the lack of desire to have a
child, to be among the top reasons for abortions. As Nunner-Winkler (1994) notes, the
question these women are answering is not whether an abortion in their situation is
morally justifiable or not, but what kind of lifestyle they want to live. According to
Nunner-Winkler, this involves, “a morally neutral balancing out of different ego
interests” (p. 269) such as the desire for a professional career versus a desire to have
children and stay home.
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In her interviews of women considering abortion, Smetana (1982) recognized
these differing frameworks that women use to make their abortion decisions. She
distinguished between three types of reasoning: moral, social-conventional, and personal.
She discovered that the type of reasoning a woman uses depends upon her belief as to
whether or not the fetus is a human life. If the woman thought the fetus was a human life,
the decision became moral for her. Research concerning adjustment following abortions
shows that the framework a woman uses in her choice to abort matters.
Women who have negative attitudes toward or are ambivalent about abortion will
experience greater negative psychological adjustment responses, including guilt, anxiety,
and depression (Adler et al., 1990, 1992; Cohan, Dunkl-Schetter, & Lydon, 1993;
Coleman, Reardon, Strahan, & Cougle, 2005). Coleman et al.’s (2005) summary of
longitudinal pre-and post-abortion studies found that although initial emotions may
resemble relief, negative emotions including dissatisfaction with the abortion decision
increase over time. This is especially evident, they noted, when the woman was
conflicted over the meaning of abortion, felt ambivalent about the pregnancy, or
experienced a bond with the fetus.

Summary
The moral development field has undergone radical transformation over the last
thirty years. It has evolved from thinking about hypothetical dilemmas to considering
actual experienced moral dilemmas. It has matured from the notion that the ability to
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make principled moral judgments precipitates moral action to a recognition that moral
reasoning is but a small factor in the complex totality of factors that contribute to moral
deeds and misdeeds. It has displaced cognition from the spot of preeminence in moral
functioning and opened itself up to the complex role that intuitions, emotions, and
motivations play in driving behavior. Moreover, it has begun to recognize the essential
role that the ever-present variable of the self has as the primary filter, processor, and
executor of morality. However, limited research exists that investigates this phenomenon
of the moral self as it is actually experienced by those who have upheld their own moral
standards in contrast to those that have not. In keeping with the movement in the field,
this study investigated, in-depth, the complexity of moral self-identity through the
experiences of pro-life women who lived the moral conundrum of an unwanted
pregnancy.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS
In light of the movement of the field of moral development, this study explored
the moral self as it was experienced by those who adhered to their own stated moral
convictions in comparison with those who did not. To accomplish this, the moral selfidentities of select pro-life women who experienced an unwanted pregnancy were
explored to consider the influence that identity had on those women’s decisions whether
or not to carry the pregnancy to term. A phenomenological method of inquiry was
utilized in order to tap into the richness of the participants’ self-identities as perceived
within the experience of an actual moral dilemma (Blasi, 2005).
This study was designed to add to the body of literature by utilizing in-depth,
semi-structured interviews with 16 self-identified pro-life women who have experienced
an unwanted pregnancy, 8 of whom terminated the pregnancy, and 8 of whom carried the
unwanted pregnancy to term. This chapter will describe (a) the choice of the qualitative
approach and the phenomenon of unwanted pregnancy in the study of moral identity; (b)
the selection of participants and the methods of negotiating access to them; (c) the
commitment to confidentiality and how that was communicated; (d) the interview guide
and procedures implemented for its use; (e) the emotional impact on the participants and
how their care was insured; (f) the procedures for data management, analysis and
verification; and (g) the approach to ethical concerns of the study.
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Research Design
Although the literature concerning moral identity and its influence on the moral
thought-action link has been inundated with philosophizing and theorizing, thoughtful
research into moral identity remains somewhat lacking (Hardy & Carlo 2005). The
previous chapter identified both qualitative and quantitative studies that researched moral
identity. Both methods have contributed to the present understanding of how moral
identity bridges the gap between moral reasoning and moral action. Although Batson and
colleagues (1997, 1999, 2002) conducted quantitative studies that included participants
who violated their own moral standards, no qualitative studies comparing the moral
identities of participants who have or have not violated their own self-identified, strongly
held moral beliefs have been completed.
Many researchers recognize that the study of moral reasoning and moral behavior
is, by its very nature, phenomenological (Kohlberg, 1981; Blasi, 1983; HigginsD'Alessandro & Power, 2005). Others, however, disagree on grounds that moral
functioning is intrinsically affective (Hoffman 2000); that moral functioning relies
heavily on intuition (Haidt 2001; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005; Walker, 2004); that action
choices are often not made through moral reasoning and deliberation (Nisan, 2004); and
that attempts to describe why one acted a certain way are usually retroactive (Haidt
2001), distorted and inaccurate (Bargh. & Chartrand, 1999). Despite these possible
limitations to a phenomenological approach, the method has considerably more strengths.
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Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004) argue that the mere fact a moral decision is
made automatically or is triggered by emotion is not proof that the decision originated
that way. Blasi (1983, 1995, 1999, 2004) has consistently argued that the essence of
morality necessitates understanding. He is even bolder when he says, “Morally positive
behavior is that behavior that corresponds to the agent’s moral judgment and is
performed because the agent understands it to be morally good” (Blasi, 1983, p. 185). He
takes this stance based on the uniqueness of moral action. Without the understanding that
an action is morally right, the completion of that deed is morally neutral. Similarly, if one
does what one knows to be right for the wrong reasons, the action is not morally positive.
A phenomenological study is best able to “hear” the moral significance of the lived
experience of each participant in a study (Creswell, 1998; van Manen, 1990).
Similarly, Blasi (1993) defines identity in subjective experiential terms. As such,
both the way that one experiences identity, as well as the content around which an
identity has been constructed, need to be considered (Blasi, 1993). In this paradigm, the
researcher studies moral identity, but also probes for the sense of agency felt in its
selection, including the sense of responsibility and fragility toward the identity. Listening
for these “voices” necessitates phenomenological research. Despite the benefits of
studying moral identity phenomenologically, very little of this type of research has been
conducted.
Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer (1984) recognized the need to research the
connection between moral thought and action. In so doing, they considered it imperative

45

that moral conduct be phenomenologically as well as behaviorally measured. An action
that is immoral to the researcher or to society may not be seen as such by those
participating in the study (Nucci, 2004). With these considerations in mind, a
phenomenological approach was used to gather interviews with multiple individuals who
experienced the moral dilemma of what to do about an unwanted pregnancy in order to
glean much-needed insight into the impact moral identity may have had upon the
decision. The participants were able to provide in-depth descriptions of their experiences
in their moral dilemmas (Creswell, 1998).
The research into the lives of women who were faced with a moral dilemma about
which they had previously made definitive abstract judgments was indeed fertile soil for
the study of moral self-identity. The use of self-described pro-life women in an unwanted
pregnancy situation was intended to insure the women held their own opinions of what is
morally right and wrong in this circumstance. This allowed moral self-identity to be
studied both through the lens of those who adhered to their own moral convictions and
the lens of those whose actions contradicted their moral beliefs
In order to form an adequate comparison for the group of women who chose
abortion, Adler et al. (1990) recommended that a group of women who surrender their
child for adoption would be ideal. Although this comparison would ensure the
unwantedness of the pregnancy, it seemed unnecessarily limiting. Women who have
moral convictions about abortion would be excluded from the study if they also have
strong moral convictions that they must live with the consequences of their own behavior
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and raise the child their actions have produced. Therefore, determining the unwantedness
of the pregnancy was sought by using probing questions about the initial thoughts and
feelings upon confirmation of pregnancy. These probing questions were among the initial
questions of the interview and determined if the interviewee was to be included in the
study (See Appendix A).
Coleman et al. (2005) suggested that an adequate comparison group for those who
chose abortions would be those who wanted an abortion, but who did not obtain one for
personal reasons such as fear, anxiety, or guilt. This idea, too, was rejected for this study
because of its limiting nature. A great deal of rich, valuable information about moral
identity might be needlessly discarded if a study of pro-life women excluded those in an
unwanted pregnancy who never allowed themselves to consider abortion. Coleman et al.
(2005) lamented the very few direct comparison studies of women who abort and women
who carry an unwanted pregnancy to term. This study was designed to have the
advantage of direct comparison of the experiences of those who aborted and those who
carried.
In light of the extensive body of research on morality that preceded this inquiry,
and to extend the research concerning the role that moral identity plays in the moral
judgment-to-action link, the following research questions framed the inquiry:
1. How do select pro-life women describe their moral self-identities prior to an
unwanted pregnancy?
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2. How do participants describe the impact of that pregnancy on their moral selfidentities?
3. What, if any, factors of their moral self-identity do participants identify as influencing
their decision to abort or to carry?

Selection of Participants
Because an unwanted pregnancy is such a private, emotionally-charged event in a
woman’s life, special attention was given to sensitively and discretely gaining access to
pro-life women who have experienced the phenomenon (Goodrum & Keys, 2007). Due
to the sensitive nature and hard-to-reach population necessary for inclusion in the study,
outcropping was chosen as an appropriate sampling technique (Lee, 1993). Outcropping
involves finding sites where the target group members can be found. Because the target
population was pro-life women who have experienced an unwanted pregnancy,
pregnancy centers were an obvious location for finding potential participants. Pro-life
pregnancy resource centers offer volunteer counseling to women in unplanned
pregnancies, as well as post-abortion counseling for women who are struggling with their
abortion decision.
Due to this researcher’s previous affiliations with pregnancy resource centers,
access to centers in Colorado and Virginia was attempted first. Once access to the
facilities was granted, criterion sampling was used to screen the potential participants to
determine who had experienced the desired phenomenon. Since the number of women
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needed for the study was not sufficient using these venues, snowball sampling of other
pregnancy center sites, maternity homes, and other pro-life agencies was then made
through church and school affiliations.
In-depth interviews were conducted with 16 self-identified pro-life women who
experienced an unwanted pregnancy, 8 of whom terminated the pregnancy and 8 of
whom carried the unwanted pregnancy to term. This number was selected as a means of
attaining proper saturation, as well as to prevent undue repetition in the collected data
(Creswell, 1998). Screening questions were asked first to insure the women met the
parameters for the phenomenon. In order to decrease the risk of selecting participants
who were merely parroting their parents’ beliefs, only self-described pro-life adults who
had been independent of parental financial dependence for at least two years prior to the
pregnancy were included in the study. Relationships other than parents which might
influence an adult are assumed to have been optional and therefore reflective of the
values of the adult. Since moral identity is not believed to be formed until late
adolescence or early adulthood (Blasi, 1993), the experience of an unplanned pregnancy
at the age of 20 years old was set as a minimum age for the participants.
As stated previously, this study included only those women who described their
pro-life position prior to their unwanted pregnancies according to Werner’s (1993)
principled pro-life definition. This means prior to pregnancy, the participants must have
(a) viewed the fetus as a person who is alive, (b) considered abortion as the taking of a
life, and (c) rejected as invalid the reasons for abortion. Although Werner (1993) did not
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include the caveat, those women who thought abortion was justified if the physical life of
the mother is threatened by the continued pregnancy were also considered pro-life and
qualified for the study. The screening process prior to the interviews probed these areas
of the participants’ stance on abortion.
The screening process prior to each interview was designed to take into account
the above parameters by limiting participation in this study to those who met the
following criteria:
1. Must have been at least 20 years old at the discovery of the pregnancy
2. Must have been financially independent from parents for at least 2 years
3. Must have been pro-life prior to the pregnancy:
(a) Viewed the fetus as a person who is alive
(b) Considered abortion as the taking of a life
(c) Considered abortion justifiable only if the actual physical life of the
mother is threatened by the continued pregnancy
4. Must have had an unwanted pregnancy:
(a) The pregnancy was aborted but not for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother, or
(b) The woman was single and the pregnancy was self-described as
“unwanted”
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Data Collection
In order to collect personal insights into the moral identities of women who have
experienced the phenomenon of an unwanted pregnancy, one-on-one, in-depth, semistructured interviews were conducted and recorded. A long interview protocol of one and
one-half to two hours (as suggested by Creswell, 1998) was followed to allow the
interviewer time to establish rapport before reaching the more sensitive, personal
questions toward the end of the interview (Goodrum & Keys, 2007). This helped elicit
the deep and rich text surrounding the phenomenon (van Manen, 1990). Verification and
triangulation of the information gathered in the interviews was garnered by requesting
journals or diaries that the women had written during or following the unwanted
pregnancy. Contact was also made with several of the women following the interview to
clarify points from the interview. Additional verification was sought by performing
member checks or taking data, and their analysis and interpretation, back to the
interviewed women to judge the credibility of the findings (Creswell, 1998).
Due to the sensitive nature of the topics which were discussed in the intensive
interviews, careful attention was paid to reassure participants of the voluntary nature of
the interview and the confidentiality. Each interviewee was given a copy of the Informed
Consent for Participation in a Research Study (Appendix B). After the researcher
verbally highlighted the key points, requested that the form be read in its entirety, and
addressed any questions or concerns about the study, the participant and researcher
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signed two consent forms each. Once researcher and participant each had a copy of the
signed consent form, the interview began.
Phenomenological inquiry calls for a guided conversation between the researcher
and the informant that stays as close to the lived experience as possible (van Manen,
1990). Thus the setting ought to be a place of comfort and lack distraction (Creswell,
1998). Face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted and recorded at the
pregnancy centers, where possible. When that was not possible or practical, a site that
was comfortable and convenient was selected by the interviewee. One interview was
conducted in a small café; ten were done either at churches or local pregnancy centers,
three were done in private homes, and two were done in work offices. The semistructured interviews followed the Interview Guide found in Appendix A, varying as the
conversation warranted, but with a focus toward remaining on the specific prompts which
were guided by the research questions (van Manen, 1990).
The interview protocol began with screening prompts to ensure the participant
met the qualifications for inclusion in the study. At the beginning of two of the
interviews, it became evident that the woman did not meet the criteria, despite having
been given clear selection requirements. One was clearly not pro-life and the other was
not pro-life prior to her abortion. Abbreviated versions of the interview were conducted
to exhibit appreciation for their willingness to participate and to communicate the value
of their stories, despite their inability to be included in the study. These 2 interviews were
not included among the 16 that formed the findings.
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Following the interview, a referral list of local counselors was provided to each
participant to give her access to help in handling painful emotions stirred up during the
interview. In addition to the interviews being recorded, field notes were written after each
interview. Several brief follow-up interviews were conducted in order to clarify and
validate information gathered during the first interview.
Data Analysis
In qualitative research, Creswell (1998) envisions data analysis as a spiral that
moves from raw data collection to the final narrative through iterative, overlapping
interpretative lenses. The gathering, transcribing, coding, and organizing of the data is
done with the sole purpose of presenting the “essence of the experience” (p.149) through
meaningful descriptions, interpretations, and classifications. The idea that the data drives
the management and analysis is the heart of qualitative research. It allows the actual
experience of those studied, rather than theories about the experience, to formulate the
overall description of the essence of that phenomenon (van Manen, 1990). Therefore,
themes for the last two chapters of this study were formulated as they emerged from the
data through the reading and re-reading of the transcripts, note-taking, and grouping of
patterns.
Interviews were transcribed verbatim in their entirety by a transcriptionist so that
they could be analyzed for emerging patterns. Editing was done by the researcher to
ensure accuracy. Transcripts were read repeatedly (Creswell, 1998). Then notes were
made for describing, classifying and interpreting. Each reading was done with the
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research questions in mind in order to keep the purpose of the study in clear focus (van
Manen, 1990).

Ethical Considerations
Qualitative research, by its very nature, brings with it ethical concerns which must
be addressed by the researcher (Creswell, 1998). These include (a) protection of the
anonymity of participants, (b) emotional support of participants, and (c) concerns about
how explicit to be with the topic of the study. The manner in which this study addressed
each of these concerns will be included in this section.
Protection of the anonymity of the participants was addressed on multiple levels.
Pseudonyms were self-selected by each interviewee at the beginning of the interview.
Only the researcher saw the identifying demographic and contact information as it was
linked with the pseudonyms of the participants. This information has remained securely
stored in a locked filing cabinet in the researcher’s home and were destroyed upon
completion of the study. Only the transcriptionist and the researcher heard the unedited,
raw data of the recorded interviews, which, at times contained actual names. Once the
transcriptions were found to be accurate, all names in them were replaced with
pseudonyms and recordings were erased.
Due to the sensitive nature of the interviews, protection and welfare of the
participants remained paramount during the interviews. Therefore, the voluntary nature of
each interview was emphasized during the review of the informed consent form.
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Additionally, the interviewees were watched carefully for distress and given the option of
stopping if they appeared to be struggling emotionally. They were offered the option of a
15-minute break from the questions or an option to discontinue the interview at any time.
None of the interviewees took the option to take a break or to discontinue, although
several were asked, and many experienced distress in the retelling of their stories.
The nature of the study required that women describe themselves in their
unwanted pregnancy without being primed with the topic of “moral identity.” Such
priming would unnecessarily taint the participants’ responses about themselves (Bargh &
Chartrand, 1999). Therefore, only general rather than specific information about the topic
of the study was offered on the informed consent form signed by the interviewees
(Creswell, 1998). The purpose of the study was stated thusly: “to gain insight into the
actual experiences of pro-life women who have faced an unwanted pregnancy in order to
understand what factors went into their decisions to abort or to carry the pregnancy to
term.” Exclusion of a specific focus on moral identity did not increase the risk to the
participants.

Summary
Following their review of moral identity literature, Hardy and Carlo (2005)
recognized the challenges of developing studies that adequately measure the complex and
dynamic concept of moral self-identity. The use of a phenomenological method of
inquiry provided a venue for hearing the richness of the participants’ voices as they
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described their self-identities before, during, and after their actual moral dilemmas (Blasi,
2005). As such, the moral self-identities of 16 select pro-life women who have
experienced an unwanted pregnancy was explored using recorded, in-depth interviews to
investigate the influence that moral identity had on those women’s decisions whether to
abort or to carry their pregnancies to term.
Selection of participants was limited to those who were 20 years of age or older,
who were financially independent, pro-life and who had experienced a self-described
unwanted pregnancy. In order to allow for comparison, 8 of those participants were
selected because they chose abortion and 8 because they carried their pregnancies to
term. The semi-structured interviews, which followed the Interview Protocol, were
recorded, transcribed by one transcriptionist, and analyzed for themes by one researcher.
Additionally, journals written by participants about their unwanted pregnancies were
collected to enhance the trustworthiness of the study.
The protection of the participants was held in higher regard than the collection of
data. As such, participants were reassured of their anonymity and their right to withdraw
from the study at any time in the Informed Consent Form which each interviewee read
and signed. The participants were offered emotional support through counselor referrals.
The topic of the study was presented to interviewees generally rather than specifically to
prevent priming them with the concept of moral identity and thereby tainting their
insights into their experiences. These methods were all designed to get to the heart of the
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complex and dynamic concept of moral self-identity as it influences behavior, while
keeping the best interests of the participants in mind.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
The movement from chapter three to chapter four, for the reader, is but the turn of
a page, but for the researcher, it has been a paradigm-altering journey into the pain and
peace inherent in the lives of pro-life women whose choices placed them at the moral
juncture of an unwanted pregnancy. This phenomenological expedition into the
experiences of 16 women who agreed to share openly what were often the lowest points
of their lives so that others either would not do likewise, or might find the strength to do
so, has been nothing short of inspiring. Along the way, the study was focused on how
these women describe their moral self-identity as it impacted their ability or inability to
adhere to their own moral convictions.
This chapter briefly introduces the 16 participants through the means of selfportraits and then presents the findings organized by the three research questions. Since
data from the actual experiences of the participants, rather than theories about the
experience, drives the management and analysis of qualitative research (van Manen,
1990), the organization of this chapter is also data driven. Thirteen sub-themes arose out
of the three main research questions and are presented as they were heard:
1. The participants’ moral self-identities as self-described prior to their unwanted
pregnancies:
(a) Moral disillusion and apathy
(b) Moral clarity
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(c) Self-focus
(d) Moral hypocrisy
2. The participants’ moral self-identities as impacted by unwanted pregnancy:
(a) Decreased moral agency
(b) Increased moral responsibility
(c) The lure of moral hypocrisy
3. The participants’ moral self-identities as it influenced their decision to carry
or to abort their pregnancies:
(a) Protection of self interests through immorality
(b) Protection of self interests through morality
(c) Connection with higher purpose
(d) Disconnection from a higher purpose
(e) Dissonance emotions
(f) Inner harmony emotions

Sketches of Participants
The task of briefly describing 16 complex women, each whose life could easily
fill a volume, is daunting. Thus, it is important to recognize that these sketches are but
brief self-portraits of each woman as gleaned from interviews lasting one to two hours.
Due to no screening for race or ethnicity, all but two of the women were Caucasian.
Concomitantly, all of the women self-identified with the Christian faith, broadly defined
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as believers of Jesus Christ. Twelve labeled themselves as non-denominational Christian
and four as Baptist. Although religion was not included as part of the screening process,
the pro-life organizations that referred the interviewees are Christian-based.
With the exception of long-time single mothers Sara and Lisa, who each
continues to struggle financially, most of the women could be described as middle class.
All but Jacky, Lisa, Lucy and Sara have attended college. Lisa and Sara have passed the
General Educational Development (GED) test. This group of women exhibit marked
variances in their education, their socio-economic status, their support from family-oforigin, and the availability of free time for the luxury of introspection. Because of these
differences, it is not surprising that some are more articulate and reflective about their
experiences than others. However, as Colby and Damon (1992) found in their interviews,
the will to stand for moral convictions does not necessarily correlate with the ability to
articulate the moral reasoning behind the judgments. Such was the case with the women
interviewed for this study.
Ironically, some of the most moving acts of selfless adherence to morality in these
interviews came from those least able to describe why they were able to do it. Thus a
portion of each of the 16 interviews has been included, from the expressive to the
inarticulate. The brief sketches below will begin with those who chose to abort their
pregnancies (Alex, Hillary, Jacky, Joan, Lucy, Marie, Sara Kensington, and Sue),
followed by the women who chose to carry their pregnancies to term (Elizabeth, Joy,
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Kay, Lisa, Nancy, Samantha, Sara and Yara). Brief demographics of both sets of women
are outlined in Table 1.
Women Who Aborted
Alex is a 20 year old from what she described as a loving southern Christian
family. She dated the son of her pastor for several years, a young man a few years her
senior who was her acting youth pastor. They remained virgins for most of their
relationship until they were alone in her parents’ vacation home. He forced himself on
her twice, even though she asked him to stop. He denied his part in the pregnancy, but
was willing to drive her 13 hours to help her get an abortion, if she promised never to
contact him again.
Hillary is a Native American, born seventh of a family of eight children, with
several older sisters who had children out of wedlock. She was married, had one child in
that relationship, and then divorced. When she was 37 and a single mother of a teenaged
son, she found herself pregnant again. Her relationship with her boyfriend at the time was
volatile and unstable. Though raised in a Christian home, she admitted that until recently
her Christian beliefs never impacted how she lived her life.
Jacky described being raised in rural Kentucky by a very loving family with lots
of extended family interaction. Her world fell apart when her father ran off with another
woman when Jacky was 15. Her mother was unable to function for the next two years, so
Jacky ran the house. She had been the self-described “good girl” until that time, when she
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became promiscuous and took up drinking and drugs. She resumed her “fun party life”
even after she became pregnant and had an abortion at age 22.
Joan, who picked her pseudo name for “Joan of Arc,” was 41 when she had her
abortion. She had been married with three children. Her husband ran off when she was
30, but she could not find him to divorce. While a single mother, she put herself through
school and became an engineer. She described herself as a “devout Catholic,” but became
disillusioned with her faith and began an affair with a married man (while still married
herself). He and his wife paid for the abortion.
Lucy remembers her father’s death when she was four. She was taken in by her
grandparents where her grandfather sexually abused her until she was 12. She got
pregnant at 15 and married at 16 years old. She carried and parented that child despite the
protests of all around her. She married a second time and was in the process of divorcing
again when she became pregnant again as the result of an affair at the age of 21. Her son
was five years old when she chose to abort her second child.
Marie remembers being sexually abused by a male and female caretaker when she
was five. Her brother, whom she suspects was abused at the same time, then began
abusing her as well. Her parents became Christians late in life and were very strict with
her. During her first year of college she told her mother of her brother’s abuse. Her
mother denied it could be true. Marie was raped in her early 20s. She began drinking and
taking drugs which helped her find a profession as a stripper for several years. Her
abortion was when she was 22-24 years old – she is unable to remember precisely.
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Sara Kensington 1 is the eldest of three in what she described as a dysfunctional,
but outwardly Charismatic Christian family from Wichita, Kansas. Her father, who was
an alcoholic, had an affair, and left the family when she was 14. Her mother became
emotionally and physically incapacitated by his departure. Sara assumed the role of the
adult, becoming the strong one in the family. Her pregnancy was by her first sexual
partner, whom she began dating when she was 20, while putting herself through college.
She was the only one interviewed who used RU 486 for her abortion.
Sue is third of four children from a Baptist, middle class, Pennsylvania family.
She is an accountant who was in an abusive relationship at 25 years old when she learned
she was pregnant. She was preparing to have major back surgery and had subjected
herself to an estimated 30 full body x-rays before discovering the pregnancy. The doctors
caring for her never told her what was wrong with the child, but they warned her that the
pregnancy could not have a “happy ending.”
Women Who Carried
Elizabeth is a twin with five older siblings. They grew up in a self-described
permissive Christian home in Southern Virginia. She reports rebelling around the age of
13, spiraling into promiscuous sex, drugs and alcohol. She almost finished college on a
track scholarship, but got injured. She had plans to go into the Marine Corps but a few

1

Sara Kensington came up with this name for herself only after prolonged struggling as to what proper

“pen name” would be “really good.”
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days before she was to report in, she found out she was pregnant. She and the father, a
Marine, chose to get married, even though they were not excited about the marriage.
They are expecting their fifth child now.
Joy grew up in rural Virginia as the only child of two well-educated Christian
parents. She is self-described as very bright and opinionated, causing her to have a
difficult relationship with her parents. She married and divorced an abusive man. Then
she went to live in a home with eight other “roommates,” one of whom got her pregnant.
She quickly broke it off when he wanted her to abort the pregnancy. She was 22 at the
time. She is raising her son.
Kay was another independent spirit who grew up in rural Virginia in what she
called a loving Christian family. Her parents each had 13 siblings so she was related to all
her neighbors. She lost her younger brother in a bicycle accident when she was 16 years
old. She finished college and went to New Zealand for a month following graduation. She
was engaged to marry a Navy pilot, but decided while she was away that she wanted to
postpone the marriage and learn to live on her own first. She became pregnant at 23 upon
her return to the United States. Her fiancé was transferred to California where he decided
to end the engagement. She has raised her daughter with her current husband’s help.
Lisa is an African American from Northern Virginia who presently works as a
maid. She grew up with a father who was rarely around, and when he was he was
verbally and emotionally abusive to her. She remembers that she and her sister were
kidnapped by her father when she was five or six. Her father told her she would never
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finish school, never get a job and never be able to live on her own. She was pregnant at
17 and kept her son. She became pregnant again when she was 27. She never married and
is raising her teenaged daughter.
Nancy, a 20-year-old, described coming from a supportive, loving Christian home
in Northern Virginia. She had very strong convictions about waiting until marriage for
intercourse. She was involved with a man she met at Bible study and found him
continually pushing the physical boundaries of the relationship they had agreed upon. She
maintains that there never was penetration, so she was unwilling to believe that she was
pregnant for some time. The man moved to California and wanted nothing to do with his
son. She placed her son with a couple in an open adoption.
Samantha grew up in what she described was a loving Christian home with both
parents and her grandmother. Her father was in the military and she grew up in several
states. She was told at 16 she would never have children. When she was 22, her mother
was killed in a motorcycle accident while her father was driving. She ran from the pain
by using drugs and partying. She attempted suicide several times and was living with an
abusive “friend” who got her pregnant just as she was moving out, at age 23. Samantha
placed her child with a couple in an open adoption.
Sara grew up in Colorado, the eldest of two girls. She never knew her father in her
youth, her mother was physically and emotionally abusive, and she was sexually abused
by a step brother. She ran away from home when she was 14 and lived in and out of
foster homes until becoming pregnant the first time at 18. The father of her child was a
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drug abuser, but she tried to make it work with him for her son. Then, at 20, she got
pregnant again by the same father. At the time of the pregnancy, she was a waitress
earning less than minimum wage. She has five children now and never married.
Yara grew up in a Catholic family in rural Philadelphia and went to Catholic
private schools all through high school. She reports being ostracized socially up through
her high school years until she discovered that smoking pot made her popular. She admits
to being an adrenaline junkie who always had a “wild side.” She received her fashion
degree while living with an abusive boyfriend whom she left just before becoming
pregnant at age 21. She has raised her son on her own.
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Table 1
Participant Demographics_____________________________________
Name
At Conceptiona
__________Prior Pgb__Education Lvl.

Age

Age at
Interview

Outcome of
Pregnancy

Alex

0

Some College

20

43

Aborted

Hillary

1

Some College

37

39

Aborted

Jacky

0

High School

22

46

Aborted

Joan

3

M.A.

41

56

Aborted

Lucy

1

High School

21

54

Aborted

Marie

0

Some College

23

37

Aborted

Sara K.

0

Some College

20

25

Aborted

Sue

0

B.A.

25

45

Aborted

Elizabeth

0

Some College

22

29

Parented

Joy

0

High School

22

32

Parented

Kay

0

B.A.

24

43

Parented

Lisa

1

G.E.D.

27

42

Parented

Nancy

0

Some College

20

24

Adoption

Samantha

0

Some College

23

26

Adoption

Sara

1

G.E.D.

20

30

Parented

Yara

0

Some College

21

39

Parented

a

At conception refers to the unwanted pregnancy researched in this study.

b

Prior Pg – Number of pregnancies each woman experienced prior to the unwanted pregnancy explored in this study –

each prior pregnancy was carried to term and parented.
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Moral Self-Identities Prior to Unwanted Pregnancies
Several moral self-identity sub-themes became apparent in the women’s
descriptions of themselves prior to their pregnancies. All of the women who aborted and
four of the women who carried described themselves using bleak terms such as: “I was a
broken person,” “I was lost,” “I was a wreck,” “I was a failure,” “I was a nothing,” “I was
obviously worthless,” “I was hopeless.” Interestingly, the descriptions from women who
carried were not as hopeless: “I was a mess,” “I didn’t respect myself,” “I was very
confused about life,” “I was on a self-destructive path.” In addition to their low opinions
of themselves, the following sub-themes arose in the narratives of the women prior to
their pregnancy and will be addressed:
1. Moral disillusionment and apathy
2. Moral clarity
3. Self focus
4. Moral hypocrisy
Moral Disillusion and Apathy
Four of the women who aborted and one who carried described events prior to
their pregnancies that led to their discovery that the world is not as they thought it should
be; subsequently, they became disillusioned with the moral structure they had trusted up
to that time. Those who experienced moral disillusionment, with the exception of Sara
Kensington, also described ensuing moral apathy.
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Marie’s moral disillusionment, for example, seemed to intensify when she finally
found the courage to tell her mother that her brother had molested her as a child. Her
Christian mother was unable to believe or hear Marie’s cry for help:
I grew up in a, you know, a family that we started off going to the Lutheran
church, and then when I was in about 7th grade, my parents became Christians
and we started going to a new church, and my dad was very strict, legalistic, and
had a very tight rein on me, and followed me around, wanted to know where I was
at all times, and which made it very difficult for me to feel like I could go to them
with things. So I definitely never told my parents about my brother until later,
after my first year of college when things started really going downhill for me…I
came home one break and I told my mom about it, that my brother had abused
me, and she said, “there’s no way he did that to you.” So I, that shut me down
completely, and pretty much at that point was when I really started to go off the
deep end, and I moved to California.
Marie’s moral disillusionment caused her to give up her virginity and spiral deeply into a
lifestyle of moral apathy:
I was doing some modeling at the time and, you know, really got wrapped up in
the wrong crowd, and I quit my nanny job and I started dancing. I was a stripper.
And that was my real way of getting back at men, because they could look but
they couldn’t touch. And so I did that for about a year and a half, or two years,
and I would have to get totally drunk or high on drugs to be able to even do it.
Likewise, Jacky was able to pinpoint the time and cause of her moral
disillusionment, which led to her own moral apathy:
I thought we were the good, trustworthy, hard working, great friendships, great
family. You know, we all, like for holidays we would always go to my
grandparents’ house, my dad’s parents. All the cousins. We all stayed all night.
We’d play Candy Land; we’d play card games; we, you know, we’d eat a lot. We,
you know – it’s all happy memories. All. Until dad left, and until that change.
Because from that point on, all the relationships were different.
Everyone, all our relationships were different. And so at the time right before the
abortion, what I thought, or what I thought was real, or what I thought was right,
all of a sudden wasn’t anymore. I completely lost the truth of, and perspective, of
– moral went out, moral went out the door. And then, again, I’m not trying to put
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all the blame there, but I can tell you that’s when the change of the crumbling
down of everything as I knew it changed. It was now broken, and then I was very
angry and pretty much just, you know, screw this. So then started smoking pot,
starting sleeping around, didn’t care. I just didn’t care. Long answer to a short
question, I didn’t care. So became very apathetic to morals, and truth, and
relationships, and holding things sacred. Everything went out the window.
Joan’s moral disillusionment seemed to have spawned from years of what she
perceived as unrewarded faithfulness for doing the right thing:
I couldn’t get that from the Catholic Church. I could get no counseling from the
Catholic Church. It was, “Go back to your husband,” but I couldn’t find my
husband, and I was run down. I had spent the past 16 years as a single mom,
celibate, working myself into the ground, with all three of my children, all
athletes…So when I went to the flesh, I went to the flesh. There were multiple
men. I went to the flesh. I can’t even count them on three hands, four hands,
because I was rebellious, I was hurt, I was confused, I had phobias, I was running
in fear and didn’t know what I was running from…
Joan described the moral apathy that followed in this manner:
I was a nothing. I was – I didn’t really have my family with me because I was
bad, I was dirty. I was, you know, not acceptable. Not acceptable in that church,
not acceptable with my family, and I didn’t like who I was, and so I didn’t care.
And my not caring hurt my children.
Similarly, Lucy, who had a child at 15, pointed to her life as a single mother and two
failed marriages as robbing her of a “Leave it to Beaver” idealism that she possessed
when she was pregnant and able to carry the first time.
Samantha was the only woman who carried who described this same type of
moral disillusionment and apathy. It came for her as a result of the death of her mother,
whom she describes as an “amazing woman”:
When I was 22, my mom was killed in a motorcycle accident, and my father was
driving, and so he, we all just kind of went through just a huge just devastating
time, and at that point I kind of figured I didn’t want to be around anyone or
anything that reminded me of my mother. It’s not that I didn’t want to remember
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her. I did remember her. It was just too painful to remember her at that time, so
that was just kind of my family life surrounding that time…
I had stopped going to school. I really just, I dropped out. I didn’t withdraw or
anything, just stopped going. And everything that I thought I would be able to
accomplish in my life, I really didn’t care about anymore. Said, you know what,
whatever, you know, this is obviously not the life that I was meant to have. I’m
just – maybe later down the road I’ll quit, you know, doing these drugs
(LAUGHS) and try and get my life back on track, but for right now, I just didn’t
care.
In contrast to the moral apathy that is so prominent in many of the stories, some of the
women maintained a sense of moral clarity prior to their unwanted pregnancy.
Moral Clarity
Four of the women who eventually carried their pregnancies to term and one who
aborted each described having a very strong and clear sense of what is morally right and
wrong, even if she chose to do wrong. This is referred to as moral clarity.
Yara described how, despite her partying and wild life prior to her pregnancy, she
still knew right from wrong:
I mean, I, you know, while I was going through all this, I still was raised in a
Catholic family, with two parents. I may not have been very close with my
parents, but they were a moral people. They taught us right and wrong, you know,
so I had that instilled within me at some – at some level I knew right from wrong,
and I just was choosing to be wrong.
Joy was able to recognize that her inner moral clarity was present despite the
absence of parental instruction. “I always had very strong – they [my parents] never
talked to me about smoking, or drugs, or drinking either, but they were very lucky in that
I just happened to have extremely strong, you know, decisions and stick by them.”
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Nancy’s moral clarity came in the form of Christian conviction that premarital sex was
wrong. She attempted to assert these convictions with the young man she was dating:
When we were dating, he would always initiate physical contact and we would,
you know, be kissing or whatever, and then it would, you know, all of a sudden
become into making out, and you know, things got hotter and heavier, and I
would always—not always, but a lot of times—I’d just be like, “Okay, will you
stop.” You know, “Stop.” And he would get really frustrated with that, and so that
was kind of a red flag. And I would talk to him about how I felt about the physical
relationship, and he was like, “You’re right, you’re right,” and he would say, you
know, “Cool it,” or whatever, but then it would just happen again.
Likewise Elizabeth became convicted that her lifestyle of partying was wrong and moved
back home with her parents in an attempt to manage her temptation.
One of the women who aborted her pregnancy, Alex, described similar moral
clarity that stemmed from her Christian faith. She described her physical relationship
with her youth pastor boyfriend this way:
And I knew better than it in my head. You know, I – you know all the facts, you
know better, but it just made sense. I know – I mean, I don’t know how to explain
that, but it just was kind of like that it made sense, and because I needed the
security of a man so bad, for whatever reason, I really trusted him, but I had told
him on the couch that I did not want to do that until we got married. That I had –
you know, we could do everything else, all these other things, but I did not want
to have sex, and that angered him, and I remember him getting off the couch and
just being very angry, and just leaving out the door and slammed the door.
Alex’s reaction to her capitulation to her boyfriend’s physical pressure to have sex also
indicates her moral clarity:
You know, some time that afternoon my sister went with her friends, and I just
remember going to the bedroom and, you know, making out or whatever, and
starting into sex, and I remember being on the bottom, and I remember at the
point of him having intercourse with me, crying and crying and crying, and just
saying please stop. No, that I can’t do this. Please stop. And I remember that, and
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I remember him not stopping, that it was not going to be something - he wasn’t
going to stop.
Self-Focus
The results of the interviews indicated that most of the women had motivations
that trumped morality as a central component to their description of themselves prior to
their pregnancies. Four of the women who aborted revealed that they were mostly selffocused. Hillary, for example, described herself this way:
I don’t know who I was. I really don’t. Like my walk of faith with God was – I
always depended on myself, and I never depended on Him. Never. Never
depended on Him. And I just couldn’t see that the choices that I made depended
on myself, how terrible, how you know, how bad things were. But it’s like I
always seemed to get through it, and I guess it kind of gave me a warped sense of
self. You know, a self reliance, thinking that okay, well I made a bad choice, but I
got through it and, you know, okay, well that’s just how I’ll handle my life.
Later in the interview, she described her morality prior to her pregnancy as doing that
which felt right for her, “[I was] again, self reliant, thinking that what I was doing was
right, and you know, just struggling.”
Sue describes a similar self-reliant moral structure. Prior to her pregnancy, she
remembers how she was bent on living as she pleased:
I was working hard and playing hard, and I kind of had, somewhere along the
line, come to the conclusion that I could do whatever I wanted, that I didn’t, I was
a technically good person, and I would just, I was in control of my own life and
where I was going to go. And I just had pretty much taken God out of the
equation, and I don’t really remember why.
Lucy remembers that her life and priorities were very simple and she describes
them in simple and succinct terms, “I was very lost, and very selfish, self-centered
person. It was all about me and my son. I think I was like that for a long time.” Similarly,
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Jacky and Sara Kensington shared their commitment to their own forms of self-focus as
their overriding priority prior to their pregnancies as well.
Two of the women who carried to term described themselves prior to pregnancy
as motivated by selfish desires. Yara held a belief that she could live as she pleased and
God would rescue her from the consequences of a lifestyle rife with poor moral choices:
You know, that’s kind of what I grew up thinking, that eventually things were
going to work themselves out, and that nothing permanent – I was really set that
nothing permanently bad was going to happen to me. I wasn’t going to get
arrested, I wasn’t going to end up with bad credit, or I wasn’t going to end up, you
know, permanently disabled because of doing drugs, you know, or you know, my
mind wasn’t going to get fried, or – and I certainly wasn’t going to end up
pregnant. That’s not going to happen to me, you know. You know, God’s got my
back. That’s not going to happen.
Samantha described her abandonment of her family, her drug addiction and her
lying as all a result of selfishness:
I was untrustworthy. I was not a very nice person. I battled with a drug addiction
to cocaine, and probably one of the main reasons was because it made me feel
numb to anything and everything. I didn’t have to deal with my mom’s death. It
was a scapegoat. And I stole from my dad, I stole his pain medication after the
accident to feed my habit, to try and get more cocaine. And I lied to everyone who
loved me, and I pushed everyone that I really knew, and knew who loved me; I
tried to push them as far away as humanly possible. I was just not a very nice
person unless there was something that I wanted. You know, I was out for my
own wellbeing, and I really, I abandoned my family when they needed me the
most. I was not – I just was not a very nice person.
Moral Hypocrisy
Several of the women admitted that they were more motivated to appear moral
than to actually be moral prior to their pregnancies. Batson et al. (1999) refers to this
motivation as moral hypocrisy. Sara Kensington, who described herself as “very
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judgmental,” having grown up in a strict Christian school, chronicles her own progression
into moral hypocrisy:
And so raising them [siblings], trying to hold the family together, just feeling the
burden of everything and the burden to be, you know, perfect and still, you know,
not let people at school and in church and stuff know that I, what’s going on,
because that was pretty shameful for me because I didn’t really know a lot of
people at that time whose families were breaking up. And so I’m trying to be
perfect at school, trying to do, maintain this Christian image that I had that
nothing was wrong, everything was fine; didn’t really tell even my best friends
what was going on, and so trying to manage my stress.
Then once she and her boyfriend began having sex she described her thoughts on what
contraception use would mean:
And so, you know, we swore that we weren’t going to do it anymore, that that
wasn’t going to happen, and obviously it did continue, and I felt trapped. I felt
helpless to stop it in a lot of ways, and I also felt like if I, you know, did any kind
of contraception or birth control, that that would have made me one of “those
girls,” you know, who, you know, were living that lifestyle of promiscuity, and
that by not using the, any kind of contraception, that I was saying, you know, oh
this was just a surprise, and it’s not really the way I am, not how I live.
Alex, who also grew up in the church, expressed her own moral hypocrisy prior to
her pregnancy as an inability to be authentic about what was going on inside of herself:
You know, I had no self-assurance, no self-confidence. It was inner though. It was
inner stuff. I could fake it to anybody. I mean, I could get in front of an entire
church and lead a youth whatever conference, and I could, you know, model or
run, or whatever, but inside at night, you know, I was scared, I was nervous, cry a
lot. So I remember that about myself mostly.
Prior to pregnancy, all but two of the women (Lisa and Sara) depicted their
lifestyles as inconsistent with their moral convictions with respect to sex before marriage;
for Lisa and Sara sex before marriage was the norm. Therefore all of the women, except
Lisa and Sara, were already trespassing their own moral convictions before they became
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pregnant. For some, the experience of an unwanted pregnancy made it easy for them to
continue down this path, as will be discussed in the next section. However, for others, the
unwanted pregnancy was the impetus for a palpable moral reversal.

Moral Self-Identity as Impacted by Unwanted Pregnancy
Haste and Locke (1983) identify a “triggering event” as some incident that creates
a powerful emotional response causing one to reexamine life’s choices, moral perspective
and sense of social responsibility. An unwanted pregnancy was such an event in the lives
of the women interviewed for this study. Yara, for example, expressed such a thought
when she said of her unwanted pregnancy, “I think, the way that I always describe it, is
sometimes you have to hit bottom before you look up, and that was my bottom.”
However, upon reflection, the women recognized the pregnancy did not always trigger
what they considered movement in a positive moral direction. The following sub-themes
became evident as the women described themselves as impacted by the dilemma of an
unwanted pregnancy:
1. Decreased Moral Agency
2. Increased Moral Responsibility
3. The Lure of Moral Hypocrisy
Decreased Moral Agency
Neutralizations are what Sykes and Matza (1957) called the thoughts used to
justify an immoral act that one is planning to commit without seeming immoral to the
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self. All of the women in this study who aborted believed they lacked the ability to do the
moral thing (prohibitive). This belief system helped decrease their feelings of
responsibility toward the moral action by convincing themselves that they were not even
given a choice in the situation. Some samples of their thinking are: “I didn’t feel like I
had a choice,” “I can’t go through with this” [pregnancy], “ I felt trapped,” “There was
nothing I could do,” “I didn’t have any choice,” “There’s no way I can have this baby,” “I
didn’t have the strength to fight it,” and “That was what I had to do.”
Four of the women who aborted described their pregnancies in terms that
indicated they viewed themselves as victims of their pregnancies or their circumstances.
Their sense of moral agency decreased as they thought themselves to be helpless
casualties of life’s injustice. Sara Kensington, for example, reported that in her
pregnancy, she felt as if she was a victim of God. She went so far as to accuse God of
being responsible for her abortion:
I remember being angry with the Lord that He even allowed me to get pregnant,
knowing that I would have an abortion. I, you know, I put the responsibility –
you, why did you let me, why did you let this happen to me?
As a victim of the Lord’s injustice through both her pregnancy and her inevitable
abortion that came with it, Sara Kensington convinced herself she was bereft of moral
agency: “I didn’t feel like I had a choice.”
Sue, who was preparing for major back surgery, already felt distraught and
burdened. The pregnancy was perceived as one more blow to someone who was already
down:
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I mean, it was – I was really scared about this surgery I was having. I was really
afraid. I mean, there was a high, a fairly good probability I could be paralyzed,
and I knew I’d have a year of recovery, I’d have to leave my job. I was just really
going through a lot, and I was scared. And then when this, you know, when I
thought I was pregnant on top of it, it was like oh my gosh, I can’t take any more.
Her guilt from the pregnancy and all the x-rays she had while pregnant seemed to render
her incapable of moral action:
I was just like – I just, at that point I had it in my head that this is what I had to do
because I had destroyed this baby and I couldn’t take care of it even if I wanted to
because I’m going to need taking care of.
Joan portrayed herself as someone who just wanted to be loved, who became the
victim of a married man who pursued her and got her pregnant, but ultimately didn’t want
her. Scorned, rejected, and feeling powerless, she developed the belief that she must
decide which of her children she would have to sacrifice:
Let’s get back into reality now. I’m pregnant, I’m a single mom, and if I carry this
baby to term and have it, I will ruin the complete relationship, if any, that I have
with my two daughters. I will have nothing. So which do I sacrifice?” It became
that to me… And I thought, how could God ever love me?
And as Joan chose to save her relationship with her other children by moving toward
what was, in her mind, an inevitable abortion, she described her sense of inability to
endure a child out of wedlock:
I looked at my youngest daughter (STARTS CRYING) and I was like – I looked
at the children that I had and I said (SOBBING) they’re all I had that I was – my
gifts that the Lord gave me, and I thought will I lose them too, because I didn’t
know Jesus enough to have the rock, to know that I could do this. That having a
child out of wedlock regardless, even if you – and I – and everything I believed
in, you know, pro-life, everything I believed in, I was going to go against. I was
going to go against.
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Increased Moral Responsibility
All eight women who carried reported that their pregnancies caused them to
develop an increased sense of responsibility. Most described considerations for what
would be in the best interests of their child. Although their conclusions as to what was
best for their children varied, their commitment to them did not. Four of the women who
carried described the pregnancy as a major positive turning point in their lives. They
described having no respect or concern for themselves, but the responsibility of caring for
an innocent one brought about a radical transformation. Yara and Samantha had similar
stories of completely eliminating their drug, alcohol, and cigarette abuse when they found
out they were pregnant. They did for their children what they were unwilling to do for
themselves. Samantha’s transformation was drastic:
Before where I didn’t feel like I had a reason to live, I tried several times to take
my own life, I finally felt like I had a purpose to live for. That it was no longer for
myself, that I had a responsibility, and it was time for me to step up and take care
of that responsibility. The day that I found out that I was pregnant was the day
that I stopped smoking cigarettes, doing cocaine, smoking marijuana, stopped
drinking.
Nancy and Samantha, who chose families to adopt their children, felt a great
responsibility to give to their children what they had been given: a stable loving family
with a father and a mother. Elizabeth, who gave up her opportunity to join the Marine
Corps, was the only woman who married the father of her baby upon the discovery of the
pregnancy. Her decision to marry the baby’s father came directly from her sense of
responsibility to her child:
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I mean, it was okay, I have made this decision and this baby is innocent. This
baby did not ask for this, and I mean, I felt like this baby was going to deserve to
have both parents. I didn’t want the whole split-up scenario that rides so rampant
right now, and damage – I mean, it’s damaging on children, and I, I mean, you,
it’s obvious, you know that, and so I was like I didn’t want to add to the statistics
there, and I think just realizing this baby was innocent. You know, they didn’t ask
for this. We made the decision, and now we have to step up to the responsibility,
is where I was at. So it was, I guess, loving the baby before I knew the baby.
Sara, a single mother who barely made minimum wage, hadn’t grown up with
much love. She found in her pregnancy an opportunity to give her child something she
lacked:
Like about here I had somebody to take care of and, you know, I just felt like I
could do this. I kind of, even though I was scared and alone, and lonely for
myself, I just felt like I could be a mom if I was given the opportunities, you
know. But I really didn’t think that – as far as like providing, yeah, maybe
somebody could have provided, you know, things better, but I just felt like
nobody could love my kids better than me.
Similarly, Lisa, who was barely scraping by financially as well, determined to
give the same to her second child as she had the first. Motivated by her own father’s
devastatingly cruel favoritism of her sister, Lisa said:
I had my first one, I did the best I could do, you know. I’ll have this one, but no
more. And that’s one of the reasons for my decisions, and I always said if I had
children, never would I – you know, if I can’t do for both of them, neither one of
them would get anything.
Yara and Joy, who ultimately parented their sons, described similar feelings of
connection and responsibility for the long-term care of their children upon learning of
their pregnancies.

80

The Lure of Moral Hypocrisy
Although Gilligan (1977) considered all decisions concerning the dilemma of an
unwanted pregnancy to be a part of the moral domain, the moral element is even more
pronounced for pro-life women faced with an unwanted pregnancy. This is especially
true for those who are part of a church that considers extramarital sex to be sinful. Six of
the women who chose abortion recognized that their desire to appear moral outweighed
their desire to be moral.
Sara Kensington articulated her own moral hypocrisy in very succinct and
descriptive terms:
I was most fearful of judgment on the part of everyone in my life. Parents, friends,
you know, church, people that I didn’t even know. You know, I was just afraid of
this idea about me that no, people would know that I wasn’t who I made myself
out to be, and that I was working so hard to hold up this image and this mask, and
that that would reveal me.
Joan used religious terms to describe her thoughts about ending the pregnancy to
continue the appearance to her church, her family, and perhaps herself that she was still
acceptable:
I don’t know if I thought it was going to be freedom, or that nobody would know
that I was bad, ugly, sinful, dirty woman, you nasty person, you – you know, look
at you. You loser. So, you know, and I, you know, my family was beginning a
little bit to come around. I had made it. I had proven that I could get a four year
degree, and my girls went to church, and I served the Lord, and I wasn’t dirty that
my husband, my first husband wasn’t with me. That I wasn’t a sinner.
The rest of the women who chose to abort similarly described their own moral
hypocrisy: Hillary acknowledged that she fooled herself into thinking she could solve her
problem by making yet one more “mistake” by having an abortion; Sue described her
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goal in deciding what to do about the pregnancy as one of taking responsibility for her
mistakes by “correcting them” through abortion; Marie described the shame she would
feel in telling her parents that she was pregnant as her main reason for considering
abortion; and Jacky believed an abortion would, “Just fix it and it’s over,” so they could
return to “our fun party life, and nobody gets hurt.”
Three of the women who carried described a strong pull toward abortion as a
means of covering up their sex outside of marriage, but were able to overcome the
temptation for a variety of reasons. Yara, for example, was able to recall the specific
mental struggle she had about abortion and her desire to not be a hypocrite:
But I wasn’t really judgmental where if somebody believed in pro-choice, I didn’t
fault them for that, and I didn’t judge them for that, but the rationale that went on
in my mind was, well if you’re pro-choice and you do something like that, it’s one
thing, but if you’re pro-life and you make a choice, and you then, you know,
consciously pro-life all of your life and then you go and have an abortion anyway,
that’s ten times worse. That was kind of the mentality that went on in my, the
struggle that went on in my brain. You know, well if you’re going to do that, and
you’ve always believed this one way, that makes you a total hypocrite, and I just,
I couldn’t bring myself to do that.
Kay remembers the temptation to abort came briefly the one time her ex-fiancé
mentioned it. She acknowledged only a moment of considering abortion so that she
would not have to face her own mother who was always very critical of girls who had
pregnancies out-of-wedlock:
I did even think about the abortion when [her ex-fiancé] mentioned it. That was
kind of the, oh well I could hide everything if I did that, you know. I don’t need
anybody’s permission or whatever. No one would have to know but me and him.
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But when queried about how she responded to him, she replied simply, “I just said I
wasn’t, I couldn’t do that. I wasn’t going to do it.”
Elizabeth recognized the temptation to accept the Marine recruiter’s suggestion
that she abort, but did not allow herself to consider it. To do so would mean, “I was
trying to cover up my wrong with more wrong. That, in my mind, was detest… like
disgusting.” Similarly, Nancy already felt so much pain because she had betrayed her
own standards about sex before marriage that the idea of violating more of her standards
through abortion was too painful to consider seriously as an option.
Summary
The stories of the women interviewed for this study indicated that their unwanted
pregnancies did have a substantial effect on their moral self-identities. The sub-themes
that described the changes they experienced included a decreased sense of moral agency,
sometimes through victimhood; an increased sense of moral responsibility because they
saw themselves as protectors; and an increased pull to look more moral than they actually
were. Each of these sub-themes appears to have played a substantial role in propelling
them toward their ultimate decisions.

Moral Self-Identity’s Influence on the Pregnancy Decision
All of the pro-life women who were interviewed for this study had to make a
decision. Some did so with a great deal of mental and emotional wrangling. For example,
Sara Kensington described arguing with God over the abortion, devaluing the fetus by
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calling it “cells” and working very hard to come to a place where she could abort, “And
so I had to find some way to separate myself from what I knew was right to be able to
make that choice, because I’d even like protested that clinic when I was little.”
Others did what they wanted without allowing themselves to think about what
they were doing. Alex, for example, was in such denial that when her Grandmother sat
her down to talk to her after learning of Alex’s pregnancy, she replied “I don’t know
what you’re talking about.”
Regardless of their decisions or how the decisions were made, each based her
decision on what mattered the most to her at the time. The sub-themes depicting moral
self-identity that were heard in the stories of how the women made their decisions were:
1. Protection of self interests through immorality
2. Protection of self interests through morality
3. Connection with a higher purpose
4. Disconnection from a higher purpose
5. Dissonance emotions
6. Inner harmony emotions
Protection of Self-Interest through Immorality
Each of the women who aborted was asked to look introspectively and describe
how she made her ultimate decision to abort; what meant the most to her in making the
decision. Upon self-analysis, each of the eight women, without exception, reported or
described protection of self interests as the overriding factor that permitted her to ignore
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her own moral beliefs about abortion and do what she really wanted to do, which was to
stop the pregnancy. Several of the women were able to articulate this finding with clarity.
Sara Kensington remembered the thoughts which helped her overcome her own
condemnation:
I remember just thinking over and over again, I want my career, I want my
education, I want my white wedding on my time. You know, I want my dream
wedding, and I don’t want it to be a shotgun wedding, and I don’t want to have a
big belly in my dress, and, you know, all these things, and I don’t want to have to
marry this guy if I don’t want to, and I’m not sure that I want to. So that was kind
of like a little stream of consciousness thought.
And later she described, clearly that she felt her self-interests were in direct conflict with
her own sense of morality. “I knew that what I was doing was wrong, but I wanted my
way more than right. My way was more important to me than the right way.”
Likewise, Marie described her self-interests as being in direct conflict with her
morality, which she linked to what her Lord would want her to do. She very succinctly
expressed her primary motivation behind her decision to abort:
Selfish. Wanting to – I mean, thinking about it back then it was an inconvenience,
definitely, to my life and I just thought there’s no way I can be a mom. I’m so
screwed up. I knew how screwed up I was, but I couldn’t see a way out of that,
and…and I just, I was so ashamed of even thinking about it, because I knew what
the Lord said about it. I knew that it was murder, but I did it anyway.
Jacky recognized the self-protective motivations behind her decision to get an
abortion as the solution to her problem. Additionally, she acknowledged that she did not
seek advice from someone who might give advice in conflict with those self-interests:
So I guess, again, so selfish, so very selfish, that it was about me. You know it
was just about, again, the solution to the problem, and it was just pretty much that
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cut and dried and simple, and I certainly didn’t consider do I need to go talk to a
preacher, or a pastor, or a priest, or a – you know, I didn’t bring in any of those.
Likewise, the other women who aborted expressed similar self-protective
motivations behind their decisions. Hillary, Lucy and Joan each reported using their own
pain as a single parent as well as the pain of their children as motivation to abort. But
each of these ladies emphasized this was a rationalization they used to fulfill their selfish
desire to end their pregnancies. Sue and Alex each allowed others to make the decision
for them as a way of minimizing their own accountability in their own minds for the
decision that they admitted they selfishly wanted to do anyway. Sue didn’t want the
responsibility of caring for a potentially deformed baby, and Alex didn’t want others to
know of the pregnancy.
Protection of Self-Interest through Morality
Although the women who carried had markedly different outcomes to their
stories, just like those who aborted, they spoke of protection of self-interests in their
decisions to parent or to put their child up for adoption. However, the difference appeared
to be what they believed was in their self-interests. Their responses indicated that for
them, following the moral path was protecting their self-interests.
Despite myriad voices telling her to abort, and offering her the money to do so,
Yara clearly articulated how she could not make that decision because it would damage
her ability to live with herself. The anticipated negative self-betrayal emotion of guilt
helped her to make a decision she could live with:
I wanted – I mean, I think – I needed to make a decision that I could live with,
and I knew I couldn’t live with an abortion. I knew. I am a very guilt ridden
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person. I carry guilt with me on a daily basis, and I knew that I could not carry
that with me. I couldn’t do that.
Sara described similar feelings about the prospect of having an abortion when she said, “I
just couldn’t live with myself.” Samantha sought out a solution that would give her
positive moral emotions and was able to find that only in the idea of adoption, although
she knew it would also give her great personal pain: “I didn’t have a peace with anything
else.”
Likewise, Joy spoke in adamant terms about her protection of self-interests when
discussing why she never allowed the thought of abortion or adoption to enter her mind:
I’m not kidding when I say abortion would’ve destroyed me…I’m in touch with
myself enough to know, you know, what I can and can’t do. Just what I’m – I’m
not strong enough to give a baby up for adoption, or to release a baby for
adoption, but I’m very pro-adoption, and my husband and I have planned on
adopting more children. And abortion was just never an option because I could
not possibly do it.
Nancy was the only one who drew on her spirituality to describe her moral
decision making. She describes sitting in an abortion clinic parking lot and coming to the
conclusion, “I can’t do this, you know. I was like, you know, I’ve got to trust God for
strength and, you know, chose another option, because I can’t do this.” And when asked
why she felt that she couldn’t do it, she responded in a way that showed how deeply her
identity was enmeshed with her God and her belief that his direction was what was best
for her. So much so, that she links her personal pain in her pregnancy to stepping outside
of his guidance:
Because I knew that it would cause more pain than I was already experiencing at
that time. I knew that the sin that I had committed, this was the—I don’t want to
say consequence—but it was, in a way, and then I thought okay, if this is the
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consequence and the pain I’m feeling right now because of that sin, if I go and
commit this other sin, it’s even greater in my mind, you know, then there’s going
to be a whole lot more pain to go along with it.
The remaining women who carried all used equally adamant responses to the question of
why they did not abort. They refused to allow themselves to consider abortion as an
option that could be in their self-interests. For example, Samantha said “That’s just not a
thought that I even…entertained”; Kay stated, “I just didn’t consider the abortion thing;”
and Elizabeth, asserted, “I can’t say it was even an option.” Lisa, in her simple response,
indicated that for her, moral beliefs equate to moral action: “I just don’t believe in that.”
The responses of the women to questions about what ultimately impacted their
decision to abort or to carry revealed moral self-identity was at the heart of their
decisions. Those who believed that their self-interests were best protected by suspending
or ignoring their own moral beliefs for this one decision - what to do with an unwanted
pregnancy - acted immorally. All the women who aborted, without exception, believe
today unequivocally, that their abortions were wrong. For the women who carried, they
believed that doing so was protective of their ultimate self-interests as well, even if it
meant sacrificing their own plans and dreams. Each of the women who carried believes
today that it was the right thing to do. The decisions seemed to hinge on their connection
with or disconnection from some higher purpose served by their pregnancies, as well.
Connection with a Higher Purpose
The self-described moral path for the pro-life women in this study was clearly the
path of inconvenience, embarrassment and delayed dreams. Therefore, not surprisingly,
those who chose this path reported a connection with a higher purpose. They each

88

describe some form of a connection or identification with some principle or being that
transcended themselves.
All of the women who carried described their adherence to their own moral values
as fulfilling a higher purpose. For Yara, Samantha, Sara, Lisa and Kay, the ability to give
life rather than take it served a higher purpose and prevented them from catering to their
desires and fears. Samantha’s account shows how her role as the protector of the life of
her unborn child added meaning and worth to her own existence:
Before where I didn’t feel like I had a reason to live, I tried several times to take
my own life, I finally felt like I had a purpose to live for. That it was no longer for
myself, that I had a responsibility, and it was time for me to (LAUGHS) step up
and take care of that responsibility.
Sara described her pregnancy as almost a calling to the valued, protective role of
motherhood this way:
I actually felt – it’s kind of hard to explain, but I actually felt, I kind of felt cool,
you know, like, you know, like I felt more important. Like about here I had
somebody to take care of and, you know, I just felt like I could do this. I kind of,
even though I was scared and alone, and lonely for myself, I just felt like I could
be a mom if I was given the opportunities, you know.
Nancy, Joy, and Elizabeth linked their moral values to a personal God whom they
pictured as knowing what was best for them and providing strength to act in accordance
with what was right. Nancy elicited her God’s help to stick to her moral convictions:
I actually drove to one [abortion clinic] and it was, the parking lot was empty. It
looked so just evil. (LAUGHS) It just looked so broken down and unattractive,
and at that point I sat in the car and I started crying, and I was like, I can’t do this,
you know. I was like, you know, I’ve got to trust God for strength and, you know,
choose another option, because I can’t do this.
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Despite her fears, Joy was able to find happiness in her pregnancy because she
believed it was part of a higher purpose and leaned on her God’s strength to sustain her
through it:
You know, I was definitely shocked and, you know, scared, but I was also happy
because I figured, you know, there was a purpose…It brought me back to my
religious roots. I got a lot closer to God really quick, because I was praying like
every day, all day long, you know, for the baby and for, you know, help me figure
this out, help me get through this.
Elizabeth’s description of her motivation to parent her child included an
understanding that the life she carried mattered to her Lord.
Pleasing the Lord, because I mean, I knew that I had, you know, made some
wrong choices, and so I think that was my biggest thing was just pleasing Him,
and knowing now I have this life that He’s entrusting to me, and how am I going
to respond, how am I going to handle it. And, you know, I definitely was wanting
to raise this baby in the ways of Him, and to grow to know Him, and so, you
know, I really had to buckle down, and it was no longer just me.
These women describe their connection with a higher purpose as being important to them
and giving them the strength they needed to follow their moral convictions. Similarly, the
women who aborted often described a disconnection from any form of a higher purpose.
Disconnection from a Higher Purpose
Six of the eight women described some form of disconnection from a higher
purpose as contributing to their abortion decision. The other two, Lucy and Alex,
reported shutting down their thoughts and emotions to prevent any connection with their
own belief system. Hillary depicts her disconnection from God as directly related to her
“terrible” choices:
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Like my walk of faith with God was – I always depended on myself, and I never
depended on Him. Never. Never depended on Him. And I just couldn’t see that
the choices that I made depended on myself, how terrible, how you know, how
bad things were.
And later, she laments that had she listened to God, it would have been better for her,
“You know I wish I could make it right. The only way I could have made it right is if I
would have listened to God and done the right thing.” Likewise, Marie, Sue, and Sara
Kensington described their purposeful focus on the difficulty of their circumstances and
their disconnection with God as contributing to their ability to choose a path that seemed
beneficial to them at the time. Sue also described her abortion as a missed opportunity to
serve the higher purpose of protecting her child, “Well, if someone broke into your house
and was going to either kill you or your baby, you would defend your child…but for me,
I took the easy way out.”
Jacky associated her morality with her family and, specifically her grandmother.
She remembered feeling the need to hide her decision from that grandmother who had
Christian beliefs. Her grandmother’s morality conflicted with what Jacky thought was in
her self-interest:
At that point I do remember thinking, what would grandma – again, grandma was
my poster of, you know, Christian, churchgoing. I remember thinking how
disappointed grandma would be. She could never know about this. This would be
so disappointing to her. And I remember thinking, it is disappointing, but it’s what
I have to do, you know.
The question of whether the women made connections with a higher purpose or were at a
point of disconnection appeared to play an important role in their emotions following
their decisions as well.
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Dissonance Emotions
According to Blasi (1999), it is wise for the researcher to investigate the
emotional responses surrounding a moral decision as indicators of whether personal
moral convictions have been violated. Embracing this suggestion, the researcher probed
the feelings of the women following their decisions to explore how deeply they held their
pro-life views. Festinger (1957) termed the emotions that follow inconsistency between
thought and action as dissonance. The dissonance emotions of the women who aborted
were especially prominent and pervasive throughout their interviews.
All eight of the women who aborted experienced unrelenting, painful moral
emotions that indicate their actions (abortion) were in conflict with their beliefs. Among
the dissonance emotions found were guilt, shame, regret, deep sorrow, and hopelessness.
Alex, Marie and Jacky each spoke of no desire to live. Marie and Jacky used illicit drugs
to diminish the pain and were bent on self-destruction. Alex, a nursing student, tried to
take her own life:
And I just remember being in perpetual motion forward. I don’t – I mean, I did
nothing. I went to school, and I ate, and I ran, and several times went to try to kill
myself. I drove out to this lake and I stole a bottle of insulin from the hospital, and
I knew that if I would inject the entire bottle of insulin, that I would go to sleep
and I’d die, and I wouldn’t be in pain. And my only fear of dying was being in
pain. I didn’t even have a healthy fear of the Lord at that time, or like that that
was a sin. I just wanted the pain to go away. I wanted the emotion to go away, I
wanted to stop thinking about it.
Sara Kensington and Jacky also described an obsession with babies as a result of
their regret. Sara K. described her fixation this way:
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I was obsessed with babies. I mean, anywhere I went, everywhere I saw – I mean,
it was all I could see was babies everywhere. And my friend had a baby that
would have been maybe four months older than mine, and I mean, I just couldn’t
get enough of him. It was like I was just so attached to him, and very depressed.
Not realizing, not connecting that at the time, but just in a deep sorrow.
Three of the women, when discussing what they would say now to someone in an
unwanted pregnancy, warned of never being able to forgive oneself for having chosen to
abort. The intense feelings of shame are evident in Hillary’s words as she imagined
herself talking to a young lady considering abortion:
When you think about how you’re going to feel if you make that decision, and not
keep your child, then you’re going to, you’re never going to escape how you’re
going to feel about that. You won’t. It will – others may see you as a good person,
but it’s never going to be how you see yourself. You’re never going to feel that
way, and it’s – you think you can go on and you can kid yourself, but you don’t.
It’s just always there, and it’s always, you know (SNIFFS), reminding you that
you were weak and you just gave in to your weakness.
All of the women who aborted described emotions of guilt and deep sorrow. As
Sue, for example, relayed an actual conversation she recently had with a woman in an
unwanted pregnancy, she provided a glimpse into the emotional devastation of her own
abortion:
I took the easy way out. And I had a lot of guilt associated with it for years and
years, so. I just, I was definitely very depressed for a long time, and you sort of
stuff it. I stuffed it. I kept stuffing it down. Not a healthy thing to do. Seventeen
years later it all came flying out…You will never forgive yourself. It will eat you.
It will just ruin your life.
Jacky very poignantly described how the progression of her decisions made her
feel about herself:
The respect level went way down. Even more so. Again, because I was the good
girl, I was the one who held out. Then I was the one who didn’t hold out. Then I
was the one who got pregnant. Now I’m the one who’s murdered my child. So
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yeah, the self respect was gone. Gone, gone. Then there was no worth or – it
doesn’t, it just so didn’t matter, it didn’t matter. Drugs didn’t matter. Guys, it
didn’t matter. Live or die, it really didn’t matter. I mean, it just didn’t matter.
There was zero worth. It was gone.
The dissonance emotions described by the women who aborted were palpable even
today, depicting the self-betrayal of their actions. On the other hand, the emotions of the
women who carried their pregnancies to term were notably different.
Inner Harmony Emotions
In keeping with Festinger’s (1957) Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, those
individuals who are able to exhibit consistency between thought and action will
experience consonance or inner harmony emotions. The women who gave their sons for
adoption, Nancy and Samantha, both described intense pain in relinquishing their
children to the adoptive parents. For example, Samantha described the pain of
relinquishing her son as, “Just a guttural…like I could not control this pain that I was
feeling.” However, later on they spoke of the peace that inner harmony brings. Nancy
said “I can now see my son where he’s at, and I just have incredible peace. I don’t have
regret; I don’t have envious feelings.” Samantha relayed similar feelings, “Best decision
of my life. I’m proud of the decision I made.”
While some described feelings of regret about becoming pregnant outside of
marriage, all of the women who carried and parented said they would do the same thing
again if they found themselves in an unwanted pregnancy, indicating feelings of inner
harmony about their decisions. Yara described her emotions after her decision as “relief.”
Likewise, Elizabeth described similar emotions, “We both felt like we were making the
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right choice, so there was satisfaction in that, and once we were married, I think there
was more relief on my part that this is the direction we’re going in.” She experienced
these emotions despite the fact that she had to give up her dream of entering the Marine
Corps. Lisa, in her concise and winsome manner, described the inner harmony that her
decisions have brought her as, “I feel good about myself. I think I’ve, me myself, I think
I’ve done pretty well.”

Summary
The findings of this study have been presented in this chapter. First, sketches of
each of the 16 women who took part in the study were given. Then each of the three main
themes and the 13 sub-themes found in each were presented. The question of how women
described their self-identities prior to their pregnancies was addressed first. In such,
moral disillusionment and apathy sub-themes were much more prevalent in those who
aborted than in those who carried. Likewise, moral clarity was a more prominent subtheme heard in the stories of those who later carried. Self focused motivations, including
moral hypocrisy, were prioritized over morality in the women who carried and aborted
alike. However these sub-themes were more prominent in the narratives of the women
who later aborted.
Findings which explored how the women’s moral self-identities changed as a
result of their unwanted pregnancy were presented next. Some of the women experienced
a decrease in their sense of moral agency through seeing themselves as a victims. Each of
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the women who aborted described feeling incapable of carrying her child to term. Those
who carried reported increases in moral responsibility because they saw themselves as an
agent of protection for their unborn child. The lure toward moral hypocrisy appeared to
increase during unwanted pregnancies in most of the women, but those who carried
described how they were able to rise above it.
The most definitive differences between the group of women who aborted and
those who carried were found during the exploration into how moral self-identity
impacted their ultimate decision. Without exception, all of the women described
protection of self-interests as a motivating factor. The women who aborted described the
belief that their self-interests were best served through their decision to override their
own moral convictions, ensuring protection of pragmatic interests at the expense of moral
ones. Conversely, the women who carried described their beliefs that their self-interests
would be ultimately protected by the decision to carry. Another sub-theme that arose was
the propensity of those who carried to link their pregnancies to a higher purpose and
those who aborted to point out their disconnection from any sense of being a part of a
higher purpose. Finally, the moral emotions experienced by the women following their
decisions were portrayed by their self-descriptions. The two sub-themes, dissonance and
inner harmony lent credence to the depth of their pro-life convictions, especially for those
who aborted.
The focus of this chapter has been to highlight the findings as they were gleaned
from the experiences of the women who found themselves in unwanted pregnancies. The
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sub-themes were self-emerging in the women’s narratives. The next chapter will present
an analysis of the findings in light of the literature, a model to structure the analysis of the
findings as they relate to and extend the literature, and recommendations for areas of
future research.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION
Overview
Jacky’s words from the previous chapter sum up the findings of this research
study in one pithy line, “It was all about me.” This was the surprising discovery for both
those who carried and those who aborted, alike. At the heart of the pro-life woman’s
moral decision in an unwanted pregnancy was protection of self-interests. No new levels
of Nirvana and no ascension to an altered state of nobility where the self does not matter
were found in the narratives of the women who carried. The findings of this study
diminished the likelihood that such an altered state of nobility exists; however, these
findings also demonstrated that such a state is not necessary for the translation of moral
beliefs into action. Those who honored their moral convictions by carrying their
pregnancies to term appeared to hold the simple belief that doing so would ultimately be
advantageous for themselves as well.
Thus the encouraging piece in the findings is that the capacity to exhibit moral
integrity in one’s life resides in regular human beings. Additionally, the findings revealed
a connection with a higher purpose was an essential element to elevating the women’s
motives above merely survival instinct. The ensuing discussion will integrate these and
other findings of this study with the literature to gain insight into how one experiences a
moral dilemma and maneuvers through the decision process to choose between routes
leading to moral integrity, or to personal akrasia.
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First, the discussion will explore the juncture of the findings and the literature as
they contribute to how one perceives oneself in a moral dilemma. Second, the focus will
turn to the self in the experience of the juncture between an immoral and a moral action.
Next, the connection to a higher purpose and the effect of that connection on the selfidentity will be considered. These findings and analyses will then be summarized into the
researcher’s synthesis of the experience of the self in a moral dilemma, presented here as
the Moral Juncture Model of Self. The model will be discussed in light of Blasi’s,
Kohlberg’s and other researcher’ contributions to the understanding of moral judgment
and action. The possibilities for further research will be recommended in the next section
and throughout the chapter. Then the implications of this study on education in moral
development and in counseling will be discussed. Lastly, a summary of the chapter,
followed by concluding thoughts on the research project will be presented.

The Perceptions of the Self in a Moral Dilemma
In his review of the literature addressing the gap between moral reasoning and
moral action, Blasi (1980)recognized the significance of the moral self to both the
success and the failure to uphold one’s own moral convictions. The findings of this study
indicated that the self was, as Blasi asserted, central to the participants’ ability to sustain
moral integrity as well as their failure to do so. If a woman viewed herself as a victim of
her pregnancy, her sense of moral agency decreased as well. This appeared to coincide
with a woman’s ability to neutralize her own beliefs about abortion and to engage in
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immoral behavior. Conversely, when a woman viewed herself as a protector of her child,
she seemed to develop feelings of moral responsibility, as well as to anticipate feelings of
dissonance if she aborted. The impact of viewing the self as a victim or a protector is
discussed in this section
Self as Victim
The women in this study who viewed themselves as victims of their
circumstances tended also to think of themselves with little sense of moral agency, and
thus appeared able to neutralize more readily. Nunner-Winkler (1993) contends that
morality is a second-order desire. This coincides with the findings in this study. When
faced with the crisis of an unwanted pregnancy, most of the women in this study had a
strong first order desire to end the pregnancy. The desire to act morally was secondary
and required the ability to see their pregnancies as more than an attack on themselves.
With this understanding, the propensity of one to think of oneself as a victim who is
responsible for protection of one’s own basic human needs such as survival, would
diminish the duty to think about second-order desires such as the right thing to do.
Moreover, in viewing oneself as a victim, the sense of moral agency is diminished, and
Bandura (2002) posits moral agency is necessary to convert moral thought into moral
action. One could argue, however, that the lack of agency beliefs are merely
neutralization (Sykes & Matza, 1957) or disengagement (Bandura, 2002) techniques used
to allow the self to follow an immoral course without seeming morally wrong.
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Using Sykes and Matza’s formulations, if a woman convinces herself that she is
merely a victim of insurmountable circumstances with no ability to carry her pregnancy
to term, then abortion can be pursued without taking responsibility for having made a
decision. This denial of responsibility for her decision neutralizes the feelings of acting
immorally. Bandura (2002) labels this kind of minimizing of one’s sense of agency and
responsibility as a disengagement technique used to allow a person to violate one’s own
standards and disengage one’s own self-sanctions. These women’s stories lend credence
to the work of Bandura (2002) as well as that of Sykes and Matza (1957).
The women who were able to convince themselves that they were victims of their
circumstances were not capable of carrying a child, or were not responsible for the
decision, were able to go through with their abortions. Like Marie, some of the women
who aborted made their lack of moral agency a mantra to help them pursue their desired
outcome, “All I kept thinking is I can’t have a baby.” Others, like Alex, became
robotically and unthinkingly obedient to those telling them to abort in order to distance
themselves from the responsibility of the decision.
Self as Protector
In contrast, upon learning of their pregnancies, some of the women perceived
themselves as instant mothers, responsible for the protection and well-being of their
children. Surprisingly, two of the women who aborted also reported such feelings.
Consequently, both faced fierce internal battles to overcome their intense feelings of love
and connection to their unborn children. Joan convinced herself that her abortion decision
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was a choice between the inevitable sacrifice of either her existing children or her unborn
child. Sara Kensington found ways to deny her victim (Sykes & Matza, 1957) or
dehumanize her victim (Bandura, 2002), by purposefully working to override her beliefs.
Her stance prior to pregnancy was, “I believed that life began at conception, that abortion
took that life, that life was sacred.” However, upon becoming pregnant, she admitted,
“We devalued it by saying it’s still just cells.” Apparently these women were not as
convincing to themselves as they would have liked. The powerful mother-love persisted
even during their abortions. Joan told of asking the child for forgiveness as it was being
extracted through the vacuum tube. Sara Kensington journaled after taking the first of her
RU 486 pills, “I lost you, I already loved you…I’ve missed out on all of your life
milestones.” These two women’s experiences bolster Verplanken and Holland’s (2002)
research indicating that even if values were central to the self, the responsibility to uphold
them was not necessarily present. This responsibility was neutralized or disengaged just
long enough for the start of the abortion procedure or the taking of a pill.
The other women who viewed themselves as mothers and therefore protectors,
became responsible agents of moral action, as Blasi (1983) suggested in his Self Model
of Moral Functioning. These women reported feeling, at some level, both responsible and
capable of the moral action of carrying their child. The moral emotions of empathy for
their children and pursuant responsibility to give them a stable upbringing both seem to
have been significant motivational factors toward moral behavior.
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Additionally, those women who anticipated that negative moral emotions such as
guilt, shame, and sorrow would be experienced if they aborted were able to recognize this
as self-destructive and therefore inhibitive. As Hoffman (2000) suggests, these moral
emotions were supportive of the women’s sense of caring and justice for their children.
However, if the women did not have a prior belief about the immorality of abortion, it is
difficult to conceive that they would have anticipated guilt from it. The implication from
this is that the women’s moral emotions supported their previous objective moral
reasoning, rather than the other way around.
The most difficult piece to glean from this section concerned with how one
perceives of oneself in a moral dilemma is direction of causality. Does the sense that one
is incapable of moral behavior lead to immoral behavior or does the desire for the
rewards of immoral behavior drive neutralizing, such as minimizing one’s sense of
agency? Do the beliefs in one’s moral agency act as a motivating factor to engage in
moral action (Bandura, 1999), or does the powerful desire to act rightly create a sense
that one is capable of doing so? While such questions are left for further research, it
seems apparent that a strong desire for the rewards of immoral behavior, in conjunction
with a lack of moral agency, is a quick path to immoral behavior. On the other hand, a
strong desire to act morally, combined with an assurance that one is capable of such
action, is a hopeful combination for moral behavior.
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The Self in the Juncture between Moral and Immoral Action
The crisis of an unwanted pregnancy in the lives of the pro-life women who
participated in this study generated a notable priority toward protection of self-interests.
Statements from those who decided to abort, such as Jacky who said, “It was so self
centered, and it was self protective,” centered on self-interests, as did statements of those
who decided to carry, such as Yara, “I needed to make a decision that I could live with.”
However, the juncture between moral integration and akrasia (or the failure to act in
accordance with one’s moral convictions) appears to hinge on what the women perceived
was in their self-interests. The default position for human nature appears to be that which
provides the most reward and the least consequence to oneself.
Protection of Self-Interests as Motivation
Krebs and Denton (2005) recognized the human propensity toward “selfishness
and self-serving biases” (p. 637) as the enemy of morality. To the contrary, the findings
of this study indicate that even those who act morally are doing so to ultimately serve the
self. As indicated above, the difference lies in which path is believed to serve the self.
When morality appears to be in conflict with self-interests, the path of akrasia is chosen.
Even if the moral structure is very firmly held at the objective level, as Bersoff (1999b)
indicated, the move to consider oneself as the sole exception to the rule is an easy hurdle
for some. The findings in this study supported this conclusion. All of the women held
steadfast beliefs about the immorality of abortion prior to their unwanted pregnancies.
However, the eight women who aborted their pregnancies clearly saw their own cases as
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an exception to the rule because of their circumstances. In other words, while moral
decisions are made objectively for others, they are often made relativistically for personal
circumstances. This allows one to avoid the reality of personal akrasia or hypocrisy.
To account for this, Nucci (2004) put forth a contextualized structuralist account
of moral reasoning which postulates that one projects one’s own moral reasoning onto a
situation only when recognizing that the decision is indeed in the moral realm. Nucci
considered the context of a decision and its ability to overshadow a person’s ability to
think and act morally to be a part of the complexity of the decision making process.
While the findings of this study supported the latter contention, the findings also
indicated that the women who believed their self-interests were served through abortion
purposefully chose how to think about the situation (pragmatically as opposed to
morally). This was apparently done so they could proceed with the abortion, while
avoiding the inner dissonance of self-condemnation that could be an inhibitor. Similarly,
several of the women who carried did so to protect their self-interests by preventing
themselves from having to experience the emotional and spiritual consequences of
abortion. This self-protective motivation heard in the narratives of those who chose to
abort and carry, alike, harkens back to Freud’s (1930/1961) pleasure principle in which
he described man as seeking pleasure and avoiding pain to the self. The diversity of the
women’s beliefs concerning what would bring the most pleasure and pain was pivotal to
their decisions.
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Akrasia
When choosing immoral behavior, the rewards to the self appear to be so enticing
that the consequences to the self are often overshadowed. The rewards include
preservation of self plans and dreams, avoidance of inconvenience, and often a
maintained or improved impression on others. Sara Kensington demonstrated several of
these in her mantra of the benefits of abortion, “I remember just thinking over and over
again, I want my career, I want my education, I want my white wedding on my time. You
know, I want my dream wedding, and I don’t want it to be a shotgun wedding…”
The idea of moral hypocrisy, posited originally by Batson et al. (1997), fits neatly
into this category of rewards being especially salient, particularly for a woman in an
environment where unwed pregnancy is looked down upon. The ability to maintain the
appearance of morality by acting immorally was very enticing and motivational to all of
the women who aborted in this study. The opportunity to do as Sue desperately wanted,
“To correct the mistake I’d made,” is incredibly attractive. In order to obtain the very
enticing and desirable rewards of the abortion, the women’s own moral belief structure
had to be impugned. In this study, the women did not do this overtly, but rather focused
on the pragmatic reasons that moral behavior would be destructive to self-interests and
therefore was not reasonable. This rescues the self from accusations that must come if the
moral belief structure is acknowledged and upheld as valid. However, if the pathway of
akrasia is chosen, after the rewards, inevitable and long-lasting consequences are
experienced.
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In this study, the mental gymnastics that were employed in order to shield the
women from dissonance emotions long enough to act immorally, wore thin over time.
The women reported loss of self respect, disconnection with a higher purpose, and
intense dissonance emotions (Festinger, 1957) such as guilt, shame and sorrow. These
emotions often began during and immediately after the abortion and were still present at
the time of the interview as was evidenced by the depth of emotional pain displayed in
their stories.
The Path of Moral Integrity
The path of moral integrity, surprisingly, fits neatly within Freud’s (1930/1961)
pleasure principle as well. Moral integrity was found in this study in those who indicated
that they believed morality would ultimately serve them and immoral action would bring
great pain to them. Unlike those on the akrasia path of immorality who focused on the
rewards to the exclusion of the consequences, those on the moral integrity pathway were
painfully aware of the consequences of immoral behavior (abortion) to themselves. These
consequences appeared excruciating and overshadowed any lure they felt toward the
rewards of abortion. The rewards to the self as a result of moral behavior, although often
delayed, were described as vital to the self. These include self-respect, increased union
with a higher purpose, and inner harmony emotions such as peace, joy, and contentment.
These rewards appeared to be quite motivating to those on the moral pathway. But moral
behavior has consequences to the self as well. In this study, these include the loss (or
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delay) of goals and plans, as well as the pain of enduring an unwed pregnancy, delivery
and beyond.
The women in this study who aborted by discounting their own moral beliefs still
live in the consequences of their decisions. While any reward for doing so has long
passed away, the betrayal of both themselves and their children has been a continuous
and deep source of pain. The dissonance emotions presented in the findings attest to this.
In contrast, those who chose the path of moral integration by heeding their own moral
beliefs and carrying their children, report that they live with no regrets about the decision
to carry. The consequences for choosing this route have not been painless; however, the
women seem to be dwelling on the rewards. In hindsight, all of the women agree that
adherence to their own moral beliefs was or would have been best for them.
The Proximity of Rewards/Consequences to the Self
Blasi’s (1984) self-model addresses the significance and salience of moral values
to the self. It speaks of the awareness and worth one places on moral values and how
proficiently they can be activated. In this study, it became apparent that the proximity of
the reward and consequences to the self for moral or immoral behavior was of greater
motivational importance. It can be argued that the proximity of rewards and
consequences determines how salient one allows one’s moral values to be in a dilemma.
Despite the significance and salience of an objective, theoretical pro-life moral belief
prior to an unwanted pregnancy, once the women were personally involved in the
dilemma, the rewards and consequences of their choices became very real. Krebs and
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Denton (2005) recognized that people in moral conflicts have a vested interest in the
consequences of the outcomes, evoking emotions that are not present in objective
reasoning about the dilemma. The construct of proximity of rewards and consequences
was formulated to account for the powerful draw toward rewards and away from
consequences heard in the participants’ stories. This construct of proximity is not so
much physical or temporal nearness, although that can be a factor. It has more to do with
emotional proximity to the potential outcomes.
The most obvious example of a reward in this study was the women’s strong
desire to not be pregnant. Each of the women felt this desire to some degree upon
learning of her pregnancy. Abortion was the only path to this reward. Proximity speaks to
the intensity of the desire for the reward and awareness of the consequences which are
influenced by the legality, availability and affordability of abortion services, the
opportunity for anonymity, the ability to neutralize effectively, the awareness of current
and anticipated moral emotions, the support of others, and the awareness of connection
with a higher power, for example. Each of these proximity factors moves the woman
emotionally closer to or farther away from the enticement of the “rewards of abortion.”
The closer she is, emotionally, to the reward of not being pregnant, the more enticing the
draw to immoral behavior and the more mental energy it takes to overcome that lure.
An example of rewards and consequences of competing proximity can be
demonstrated by Nancy’s experience of sitting in the parking lot of the local abortion
clinic. Physically, abortion was there, available and anonymous. It would provide her a
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way to hide her moral failure from her parents and protect them from the pain she was
enduring. It would allow her to finish her college and career uninterrupted. Each of these
factors increased her emotional proximity to the reward of abortion as the solution.
However, she had some powerful inhibitive factors at work as well. She was
experiencing intense moral dissonance from having traversed her own sexual mores,
causing her the severe emotional pain of guilt, regret and anguish. She was in close
proximity to the emotional consequences for her first moral self-betrayal and she
anticipated the painful moral emotions of a more grievous trespass, that of abortion. Even
in the abortion clinic parking lot, she could not separate herself from her beliefs that her
morals served a higher purpose and were ultimately self-protective. In the end, her
proximity to the consequences of an abortion and to the rewards of remaining connected
to her God prevented her from taking that route. She was very aware of the potential
increase in emotional and spiritual pain an abortion would cause her.
Nucci (2004) recognized that the moral psychology field needs to account for
when individuals prioritize their moral values and when they do not. Addressing
proximity of rewards and consequences recognizes the old adage that “we do what we
want to do.” “What ‘really matters’” (Blasi, 2005, p.92) to an individual at a moral
junction is determined by that individual’s awareness of the rewards and consequences
for both the moral and the immoral choices that lie ahead. What one chooses at the moral
junction defines what mattered the most during the moment of decision. Moral growth
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occurs when one can look back over immoral decisions and accept this truth about
oneself.
This idea of proximity of rewards and consequences can be instructive as well.
Acknowledging one’s draw toward immoral behavior that is emotionally or physically
near allows one the opportunity to set up protective measures that distance oneself from
those tempting rewards. Additionally, the reminders of the consequences to the self of
immoral behavior and of the rewards for moral behavior can facilitate taking the higher
road of moral integrity.

The Self in Relation to a Higher Purpose
In their research of moral exemplars, Colby and Damon (1992) found that select
members of their group were determined to reach for a “purpose beyond themselves” (p.
300). Such was the case in this study as well. Examples of higher purposes noted by
participants in this study covered a broad spectrum. Some believed in the benefit of
obeying God; others believed in the importance of preserving all life. Although varied in
content, these connections to a higher purpose were heard repeatedly in the stories of
those who carried, and were conspicuously missing by those who aborted. This section
will explore the findings of this study in tandem with the literature on the subject, first in
a discussion of the disconnection from a higher purpose and then a discussion of the
philosophical necessity for the connection of morality with a higher purpose.
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Disconnection from a Higher Purpose
Six of eight of the women in this study who aborted evidenced a disconnection
with a higher purpose which appeared to contribute to their willingness to take a direction
they viewed as immoral. This disconnection ranged in severity from those who
experienced general moral disillusionment such as Jacky, “So [I] became very apathetic
to morals, and truth, and relationships, and holding things sacred. Everything went out
the window;” to those for whom morality had become connected to nothing beyond
themselves such as Hillary, “[I was] again, self reliant, thinking that what I was doing
was right;” to those like Alex and Sara Kensington who maintained vestiges of moral
clarity based on their relationship with God that they chose to ignore just long enough to
abort and maintain their moral appearance. The disconnection to a sense of higher
purpose experienced by participants of this study made it difficult for them to perceive of
morality as anything beneficial to themselves; rather, they viewed it as nothing more than
an unnecessary, external, untrustworthy constraint which, in this case, contradicted their
self-interests.
As discussed in the findings about moral disillusionment, the women in this study
appeared to develop their morals in relation with others. These findings correspond with
Piaget’s (1969) playground findings where he noticed from his observations of children
that morals are developed in cooperative relationships. However, Piaget was convinced
that heteronomy, or learning from authority figures, was not as effective as peer
cooperative learning. The findings of this study indicate that both the quality of the
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heteronomous relationships and the ability of the authority figures to live the morals they
conveyed were vital.
The women in the abortion group who were victims of moral wrongdoing by a
parent or authority figure – Sara Kensington, Jacky, Lucy, and Marie – each experienced
an extreme downward moral spiral. Once they recognized the moral hypocrisy in their
authority figures’ lives, the women jettisoned the principles taught by the hypocrites.
Why some women dismiss the morals of authority figures who harm them and some keep
the moral values, but dismiss their teachers as flawed, are questions for further research.
Straub (2005) contends that morality has fertile ground for growth in
environments where man’s basic psychological needs are fulfilled. The case could be
made that the women who felt deprived of some of these basic needs abandoned their
idealistic desire for transcendence. Similarly, Nunner-Winkler’s (1993) assertion that
morality is a second-order desire, rising above the basal desires for things such as
pleasure, indicates that those who experienced first order deprivation may have
experienced diminished motivation to reach for higher purposes. Along with the integrity
of the authority figure who taught the morals and the capacity to think beyond basic
needs, the stability of the higher purpose itself was significant, as well.
Kohlberg (1981) insisted that morality be linked to a universal, philosophical
principle. He knew relativistic arguments had been used to justify the Holocaust, and he
held that some things (such as annihilation of an entire race) were morally wrong. He
proposed justice as the over-arching principle that moral actions were intended to uphold.
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Gilligan (1982) believed that she heard the voice of caring as another, equally worthwhile
principle, which morality serves. A variety of higher purposes were heard in this study.
Repeatedly, when the higher purpose itself on which the women had built their
moral foundations appeared to have failed, the women were no longer able to trust that
morality served their self-interests. Jacky’s morality constructed around her family fell
with the demise of her family as she knew it. Joan’s morality built around a religion of
works, which taught earthly rewards from God for obedience, crumbled over time as she
felt unrewarded. Lucy’s dream of an Ozzie and Harriet life became dismantled with the
demise of her second marriage. Marie’s belief in a God of love and truth collapsed when
her Christian mother discounted the veracity of Marie’s claims of abuse by her brother.
Samantha’s trust in a loving, compassionate God was shattered when her devoted,
selfless Christian mother was killed in a motorcycle accident.
A connection to a higher purpose appears to be affected by the moral integrity of
the authority figure, the ability to think on a transcendent plane and stability of the higher
purpose itself. Regardless of the influences which affect connection to a higher purpose,
the lack of connection to a higher purpose experienced by the women in this study had a
profound impact upon their views of morality and consequently their decision to abort or
carry.
Connection with Varied Higher Purposes
All of the women interviewed for this study who carried their unwanted
pregnancies to term spoke of some connection with a higher purpose as a motivating
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factor behind their moral decisions. The findings of this study revealed several principles
toward which the participants felt moral obligation. Those principles were quite varied
and some were more encompassing than others. Some women believed in a deep abiding
relationship with a personal God whose scriptures guided them. Lisa and Sara, both of
whom later carried their pregnancies, determined that the poor treatment by their parents
was wrong, and therefore they developed reactionary principles that were deeply
entrenched and guided their lives. Sara never felt loved by her parents, creating in Sara an
intense obligation to love her children. Lisa’s sister was the favorite child, so Lisa’s sense
of duty included treating her children fairly.
Other participants held tightly to higher purposes because it was what they were
given. Elizabeth, Nancy and Samantha believed strongly in not merely the right to life,
but life in a stable, intact immediate family. Elizabeth married the father of her child
while Nancy and Samantha each chose a couple to adopt their children. In hindsight,
Samantha spoke of God’s higher purpose in her life and in her pregnancy:
I mean, [my son] is my gift. You know, I still love him with all of my heart, and
he is probably the most important, the single most important thing in my life right
now, but he was always meant for [the adoptive couple]. You know, God, as soon
as I made the decision, you know right when I made the decision to have sex, and
God knew what was going to happen and said, “You know what? I have this
couple, and this is going to be the couple,” and He knew, and He had them, and I
mean, it was just, it was perfect. I mean, they are his parents, 100% his parents. I
got the honor of carrying Regan for nine months, but he was always meant for
them. Always meant for them.
The concept of a higher purpose and how motivated each woman was to remain or
become connected to it appeared to be significant in her ability to uphold her own moral
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standards. If she was disconnected from that sense of a higher purpose during her
unwanted pregnancy, she was more likely to abort. A connection to, and a trust in that
higher purpose appeared to contribute to the belief that moral action would ultimately
serve self-interests, even if pain was a certainty on that pathway.
Significance of Connection with a Higher Purpose
The idea that moral action is motivated by connection to or identification with a
higher purpose has been found in several qualitative studies (Colby & Damon, 1992;
Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Although the motivational power of the ultimate rewards of
religion was discounted by Krebs and Denton (2005), this study found that faith in a
transcendent being was indeed a motivational pull toward moral behavior. Power’s
(2005) contention that a power beyond the self could provide a needed sense of moral
agency was indeed supported by some of the women who carried in this study. However,
his idea that this connection could provide the means for someone to act in a “supramoral
self” (Power, 2005, p. 237) was not supported here. Colby and Damon (1992), Oliner and
Oliner (1988), and the findings of this study all point out that those who do morally
courageous acts are normal and average people who perceive of themselves as nothing
out of the ordinary. One possible reason for this could be that those who act morally feel
they are serving their self interests through their moral actions and their connection to a
higher purpose, as opposed to doing something incredibly selfless.
Statements from participants, such as Lisa’s “I just couldn’t live with myself,”
and Yara’s “I knew I couldn’t live with an abortion,” indicate that there was a point of
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moral self-integration where they believed that morality served their self-interests. This is
an extension to the literature concerning moral identity and the motivations to act
morally. Those who carried their pregnancies to term, in making the choice to remain or
become connected with a higher purpose by living within their own moral convictions,
appeared to do so because it was in their self-interests. In so doing, they discovered a path
of regret-free inner harmony that came with the connection to that higher purpose, despite
the hardships of single parenting or the placement of their children for adoption. These
findings support Blasi’s (2004) claim that one truly becomes oneself in living out one’s
core ideals. Oliner and Oliner (1988) found that those who rescued Jews from the Nazi
regime experienced the enduring reward inherent in the significance of their moral
actions. Likewise, the participants in this study who chose to act with moral integrity and
carry their children are left with the enduring reward of that decision.
Similar to the women who carried, the women who aborted did so believing that
they were serving self-interests. However, this study found that immoral action done in
self-interest that requires disconnection from a higher purpose appears to be ultimately
detrimental to the self. Unlike the women who carried and have experienced the enduring
rewards of their choice, the women who aborted have long ago discounted any rewards
their abortions provided them. What remained for them were the regrets and the
dissonance emotions of guilt and sorrow. Although five of the eight women have sought
out post-abortion counseling and believe that they are forgiven by their God, all of them
continue to struggle with forgiving themselves. Five of those women now work for or
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volunteer their time to pro-life counseling ministries in order to use their regrets to help
others make better choices. They are trying to use their stories of pain and sorrow to
serve a higher purpose: preventing others from facing a similar lifetime of regret.

Moral Juncture Model of Self
As the findings and the analysis were being assimilated, a picture of how the
moral self-identities of the women in this study impacted their decision-making began to
take shape. A preliminary model is presented here to structure the findings of this study
in context with the literature and to provide a framework for future research.
An Overview of the Model
The complexity of a single moral decision is perplexingly complicated and
multifaceted. Thus, a simple model might seem both presumptuous and naive. However,
using the principle of parsimony, sometimes the simplest explanations are the most
useful. With this principle in mind, the Moral Juncture Model of Self (Figure 1) is
presented here as a simple explanation of the intersection of morality and the self in the
decisions of the women in this study. The model is merely a reflection of the experiences
of the 16 pro-life women in an unwanted pregnancy in this study, but it has potential for
expansion to the body of moral self-identity and decision making as well. That possibility
is a question for researchers to follow.
The Moral Juncture Model of Self assumes that an objective moral judgment has
previously been rendered for the moral dilemma being faced and therefore a moral
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conviction has been formed prior to the specific dilemma addressed by the model. The
model begins with the self in that particular moral dilemma. Factors that would impact
the self in a moral dilemma would include one’s moral history, sense of moral agency
(Bandura, 2002), moral emotions (Blasi, 1999; Hoffman, 2000), moral motivations
(Batson et al., 1997; Blasi, 1999; Nunner-Winkler, 1993; Power, 2005), moral intuitions
(Haidt 2001), desires, personality (Blasi, 1995; Oliner & Oliner, 1988), spirituality
(Power, 2005), ability to neutralize (Bandura, 2002; Sykes & Matza, 1957), and the
context of the dilemma (Bersoff, 1999b; Krebs & Denton, 2005; Nisan, 2004). All of
these elements factor into and impact how one perceives the self in this specific moral
dilemma.
According to the findings of this study, the primary motive for the self in a moral
dilemma is protection of self-interests. The direction one takes at this fork in the road
constitutes a decision between moral integrity, that is, adherence with one’s own predetermined objective moral judgments, and akrasia, the pathway to action that conflicts
with previous moral reasoning on the subject. All the factors mentioned above affect the
propensity toward the higher path of moral integration or the lower path of akrasia.
The proximity of anticipated rewards and consequences to the self for following
the higher or the lower pathway, as introduced in a previous discussion, has the
predilection for overriding all previous moral reasoning about this dilemma and other
factors which have been shown to impact the moral self. The awareness of competing
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rewards and consequences answers the question, “What matters most to me in this
dilemma?” The answers to this question will govern which rewards and consequences are
emotionally held close and are thus motivational. The proximity of rewards and
consequences additionally affects the belief system about the importance of morality.
The pivotal point of decision will come from the answer to the question, “What is
in my self-interest?” The higher path of moral integration is motivated by the belief that
morality ultimately serves the self. This pathway is one of trust in and connection with
some form of higher purpose. The lower pathway begins with the belief that morality
conflicts with self-interests. To take this pathway, connection with a higher purpose must
be temporarily severed (or prevented from forming) and the focus must remain on
pragmatic considerations above principled reasoning.
If the higher path is chosen, resulting in action commensurate with moral
convictions, the consequences to the self, such as loss of pragmatic dreams and plans
must be endured. However, these are filtered by the ultimate rewards to the self, such as
self-respect, inner harmony emotions (peace, contentment, satisfaction), and an increased
sense of union with the higher purpose. If the lower default path is chosen, the pragmatic
rewards to self, such as attainment of desires and preservation of self-plans and dreams,
are experienced. However, these are overshadowed over time by the consequences to the
self: loss of self-respect, disconnection with a higher purpose and intense dissonance
emotions. In the end, the enduring legacy of the lower pathway is the lasting consequence
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to the self; the legacy of the higher road is the enduring reward of significance beyond the
self.
Differences from Blasi’s Moral Model of Self Functioning
Nucci (2004) and Nisan (2004) criticized as simplistic Blasi’s (1984) Self Model
of Moral Functioning with its three components: the moral self, moral responsibility and
self-consistency. They argued his model was not complex enough to describe real-world
moral functioning. Blasi’s model is built on the understanding that as one values morality
as part of the core identity, one will feel more responsible toward acting moral and will
thus be motivated to act in a congruent manner where moral beliefs match moral actions.
The complexities of understanding how temptations toward immoral behavior affect
those in moral dilemmas are not addressed by the model. The conceptual problem that
Nucci (2004) and Nisan (2004) appear to have concerning the application of Blasi’s
model arises when attempting to understand the majority of real moral decisions. Blasi
(1993) does recognize that a deeply moral person can act immorally:
A person can be deeply moral even if he or she engages in actions that are morally
ambiguous or outright immoral; in this case, the integration of morality and
personality could be seen in one’s response to one’s own action, e.g., regret, guilt,
and concrete attempts to repair the damage and reconstitute one’s values (p. 120).
However, his model does not account for how this happens, especially if the person
deeply values and identifies with morality, feels acutely responsible to act morally, and
longs to act consistently on those morals. While it makes sense that when one acts
immorally, either morality was not prioritized, or one did not feel responsible to act
morally, or the draw to remain morally consistent wasn’t an adequate motivator, there are
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probably better explanations for the lure toward immoral behavior. A model such as the
Moral Juncture Model of Self (described above) is intended to extend Blasi’s (1984) Self
Model to address the realities of decision-making in the moral realm. The temptation of
the rewards of immoral behavior beckons even the best of moral exemplars.
Another way that the Moral Juncture Model of Self differs from Blasi’s (1984)
model is in the conceptualization of the moral self. The problem with the concept of the
moral self in Blasi’s model, once again, has to do with how this applies when one does
not prioritize morality in oneself. If one prioritizes pragmatism above morality, does this
constitute a less-than-moral self? Because of the problems with defining and
understanding the concept of the moral self, the model presented in this paper depicts the
self independent of, but in relation to moral values. It is when one understands and acts
on the belief that morality ultimately serves the self that moral integration is reached
during that specific moral dilemma.
The Moral Juncture Model of Self depicts a single moral dilemma, and describes
how the decision is made for that particular dilemma. Each moral dilemma has a different
set of factors that impact a decision. The possibility for growth in moral integrity exists as
one chooses the path of moral integration over and over, but the possibility for failure
exists with every moral dilemma as well. Moral behavior, according to this model is even
more significant when it becomes consistent behavior because the possibility for failure
always exists and continually tempts the one in the dilemma.
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Blasi’s (1984) Self Model of Moral Functioning shows up in several places in the
model presented here. How one perceives oneself in a moral dilemma would be affected
by how closely one values morality and how responsible one feels to act morally. The
desire for consistency shows up in this model in the proximity of rewards and
consequences. If one values morality and feels responsible toward it, then the anticipation
of dissonance emotions if one acts immorally will be emotionally near and prohibitive.
However, the Moral Juncture Model of the Self acknowledges that the temptation for the
reward of immoral behavior can draw emotionally closer, and thus override the fear of
consequences for the immoral behavior.
The Moral Juncture Model of Self clarifies the use of the word moral, as well.
Blasi (2004) criticized the propensity in the literature for authors to confuse the word
moral for all decisions that have “characteristics associated with moral functioning”
(p.346), regardless of whether they are moral or immoral. This problem certainly existed
in Gilligan’s (1982) qualitative interviews of women in an abortion dilemma. Those who
believed they would be killing their children but aborted anyway were making “moral”
decisions alongside the moral decisions of those who refused to do so. Neutralizations
were analyzed as moral reasoning. Hopefully the Moral Juncture Model of Self will help
clarify such confusion.
Revisiting Kohlberg
The disappointing aspect of the Moral Juncture Model of Self lies in its centering
on the protection of self-interests. In Kohlberg’s (1981) stage and sequence model, he
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visualized moral development as a movement away from self-interests toward principled
reasoning. Although not specifically studied, reasoning from all of Kohlberg’s stages was
evident in the women interviewed. Most were able to reason in a principled manner
before they were in an unwanted pregnancy; however, upon finding themselves in the
dilemma, they moved to an orientation of satisfying their own needs. Those who carried
differed from those who aborted in that they believed the moral action could satisfy their
deepest needs. The Moral Juncture Model of Self accounts for this movement by
recognizing all personal moral decisions are made through the filter of self-interests. This
might be a reason for the previous findings that people reason at higher stages when
reasoning objectively than when they are in the midst of the same moral dilemma
(Armon, 1995, 1998; Foster & Sprinthall, 1992; Krebs & Denton, 2005). This might also
help explain why Colby and Damon (1992) found that the moral exemplars in their study
were not all reasoning at higher principled stages.
In accord with other researchers (Blasi, 1999; Bergman, 2002; Hoffman, 2000;
Rest, Narvarez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999), this model embraces Kohlberg’s (1981) belief
in the significance of the ability to reason morally and to develop toward more principled
reasoning abilities. The model assumes that moral reasoning has led one to a belief about
the right thing to do in the moral dilemma in which one finds oneself, or at least one has
developed principles to guide one into knowing what would be right and wrong in the
predicament. However, according to this model, only when a connection is made between
objective moral reasoning and how it ultimately serves the self to become part of a higher
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purpose, does the reasoning become personal. Since one reasons through the filter of the
self in a moral dilemma, unless one is able to perceive how morality will ultimately serve
the self, one is less likely to pursue the moral course of action. This model challenges the
belief that people are capable of ascending to a level where the self-interests do not enter
into the deliberation of a moral dilemma.
Kohlberg’s model was formulated to understand development in objective moral
reasoning; it was not intended to describe motivations toward moral behavior (Colby,
2002). The Moral Juncture Model of Self was developed to address the motivations
toward moral as well as the natural temptation toward the immoral, if it appears to serve
the self. This model was developed by incorporating findings from the decision-making
experiences of those who made immoral as well as moral choices, while assimilating
research into decision-making behind morally deviant behavior as well as that of moral
exemplars. In so doing, this model hopefully sheds light on why the same person could
act morally in one situation and immorally in another.
This section of the chapter has presented a self model of moral decision-making
as derived from the experiences of the women in this study and from the literature. A
visual portrayal of the delineating factors that propel one to remain true to one’s moral
convictions or that lure one to the path of akrasia has been presented. This is a simple
attempt to describe the phenomenon of the selection of divergent paths for those with
similar moral convictions as heard from the women in this study. Additionally, this
section has contrasted the self model of moral decision-making with Blasi’s self model of
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moral functioning and Kohlberg’s (1981) universal levels of development in moral
thought.
Additional Comparisons with the Literature
Several of the factors affecting one’s ability to act on one’s moral convictions as
discussed previously in the literature review were indeed present in the findings of this
study. Moral emotions, as Eisenberg (2000) stated, appeared to indeed motivate both selfdescribed moral and immoral behaviors. Guilt and shame associated with the unwanted
pregnancy at times appeared to motivate women to abort in order to eliminate the
pregnancy causing those emotions. Conversely, the painful guilt emotions from the
unwanted pregnancy also seemed able to motivate some to carry to term to avoid further
guilt from an abortion. Eisenberg’s (2000) contention that non-moral emotions such as
anger, frustration, and fear can impact moral functioning was supported by this study.
Hoffman’s (2000) recognition of the limitations of moral emotions to guide moral
behavior, such as the “here-and-now” bias favoring those close to oneself (in this case
protection of one’s self-interests through abortion) appeared to be relevant to this study.
As Hoffman asserted, it was hard to ferret out when moral emotions were motivators and
when they were responses of those motivated to act morally.
The idea behind the proximity of rewards in the Moral Juncture Model of Self
takes into account how the moral emotions can cause one to emotionally move toward or
away from a moral decision. For example, a woman may have become more emotionally
attached to the idea of carrying her child because of empathy or a woman may have
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moved away from the idea of carrying a child to term because of anticipated shame
emotions associated with unwed pregnancy. The idea of moral intuitions is similarly
addressed in the proximity of rewards.
Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist approach that recognizes the sudden appearance
of moral thoughts could be explained in this model as a sudden propelling toward one
outcome (carry or abort) driven by the close proximity to the rewards to the self or the
consequences to the self of that decision. The experience that some of the women
described sounded as Haidt (2001) asserted, that they made their decision and then
became like a lawyer, defending their decision to themselves and to others. This ability to
defend the decision could also be called neutralization or rationalization, if the decision is
believed by the one making it to be immoral. As Bandura (2002) asserted, the women
who were better at using disengagement techniques such as avoiding their own thoughts,
allowing others to make the decision, using euphemistic language and convincing
themselves that they could not carry to term, were among those who went through with
their initial intuitions and aborted.
Moral motivation, as defined by Power (2005) as the desire for the morally good,
is also evident in the Moral Juncture Model of Self’s proximity of rewards and
consequences. The things that matter to one, and therefore are emotionally “close” in the
moral decision-making process indicate what motivates a person. If one anticipated a
great amount of guilt surrounding an immoral action, it is apparent that one is motivated
by morality. If very little guilt is anticipated when planning to act immorally, one is
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probably not overly motivated by morality. For many of the women who aborted, it was
apparent that their pragmatic concerns for freedom, education, career, or financial
stability were more motivational than their desire to do what they believed was the right
thing to do. This finding squares nicely with Bersoff’s (1999b) hypothesis that when
other life goals outweigh one’s desire to be moral, the behavior follows the motivation.
This becomes apparent in the Juncture Model when looking at what rewards and
consequences mattered the most thereby affecting the decision. The next section will
address proposed praxis for the model presented in this study.

Implications for Practice
The Moral Juncture Model of Self has practical implications for moral
development education as well as in counseling practice. For moral educators, the model
points to the importance of understanding the higher purpose that is served by one’s
moral convictions. As Kohlberg (1981) recognized, moral education requires an
understanding of the reasons one ought to be moral. The Moral Juncture Model is a
reminder to those who hope to help others develop not merely in moral thought, but in
moral action, of the necessity to connect those morals with a higher purpose.
Additionally, the model points to the importance of understanding how morals serve the
self interest. The benefits of connection to a higher purpose could be purposefully and
sincerely explored.
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Likewise, the impact that the proximity of rewards and consequences has on one’s
ability to make moral decisions congruent with moral convictions could be a beneficial
concept to moral educators hoping to engage students in lively, productive, and realistic
scenarios. As the Juncture Model depicts, the propensity to negate one’s own convictions
when the rewards of doing so seem proximal and tangible is a temptation that could be at
least brought to the conscious level through education. This temptation and the
destructive nature of the consequences could then be considered consciously, rather than
allowing the power of the subconscious to pull toward apparent rewards to self and to
influence decisions, unchecked.
Kohlberg’s (1971) ideas about moral education’s use of Socratic questioning may
have spent too much time pondering dilemmas where there was no clear moral and
immoral decision – choosing to focus on the structure of the reasoning rather than the
outcome. The Juncture Model depicts that even when there is a clear-cut conviction, the
choice can seem hard because of the proximal nature of the rewards of immoral behavior
to the self. Socratic discussions of the long-term pain of a disconnection from a higher
purpose and the painful, lasting dissonance emotions caused by akrasia may be more
productive for moral educators.
In counseling, the Juncture Model would indicate that Socratic questioning about
the higher purpose the clients’ decisions may serve and the long-term value of connection
with that higher purpose may help clients remain true to their own moral convictions.
Additionally, questioning about the long-term consequences for the decision may help the
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client to focus on the rewards for remaining true to their own moral convictions and aid
the client in making a decision congruent with his or her own value system. The next
section is provided to suggest further research to answer questions generated by this
study.

Recommendations for Research
Similar to most research projects, this study has probably generated more
questions than it has answered. Recommendations for further study in several areas in
addition to those suggested earlier in this chapter will be presented here. First, further
investigation will be proposed into the area of moral development as spawned by the
findings of moral disillusionment. Secondly, questions that arose about the conceptual
construct of a higher purpose as a basis for moral action will be presented as possible
research topics. Finally, suggestions for further research into the validity of the proposed
model will be addressed.
Moral disillusionment was a prominent finding in this study. Just as immorality
needs to be studied in the context of moral decision making (Joy, 1983), so does moral
disillusionment as a potential juggernaut to moral development. As such, the prominent
place held by relationships, both positive and negative, in moral identity formation is
worth revisiting in-depth. The impact that the moral integrity or the moral hypocrisy
shown by authority figures in a child’s life has on their moral development would make a
useful study.
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Perhaps the most significant question that arose from this study is one that has
been bantered through the ages. Although philosophical in nature, the idea of morality, as
Kohlberg (1981) asserted, begs the question, what is the higher purpose that morality
serves? Is it merely whatever principles one vows to pledge? Are some higher purposes
better than others at encouraging moral integration? If one believes that the higher
purposes are defined by a god, does the ubiquitous nature, stability, accountability, and
the understanding of the source of morality help one maintain moral convictions?
Investigation into the Moral Juncture Model of Self presented in this research
paper would be helpful. First, does the model fit the experiences of other populations in
other moral dilemmas outside of pro-life women in unplanned pregnancies? Do repetitive
iterations on either level of the model (moral integration or akrasia) by the same person
predict the path that person will take in future moral dilemmas? What kind of counseling
interventions can be implemented to increase connection with a higher purpose and
therefore a greater proclivity toward moral integration?

Summary
In this chapter, the findings of the study were compared with the literature to
discuss what factors impacted one’s moral self-perception. Following this assessment, a
discussion of how that self-perception impacted the actual decision-making processes of
the women in a moral dilemma was presented. The construct of a higher purpose, which
was found in the interviews and the literature alike, was presented as it affected the
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ability to act in accordance with one’s moral convictions. A synthesis of the literature and
the findings was then presented in a visual version of the researcher’s concept of how
they integrate into a decision-making model, called the Moral Juncture Model of Self.
This model was then compared and contrasted with other researchers’ findings about the
moral judgment-action relationship. Finally, implications for practice, as well as
questions and possibilities for future research were provided.

Concluding Thoughts
Blasi (1983) is credited with being the first researcher to recognize the
significance of self as filling the gap between moral thought and moral action. Such was
found to be the case in this study. However, at the heart of the juncture between moral
and immoral action was the question of what best protected self-interests. The central
prominence that the self played in the role of moral decision-making and how the self
would be affected by the consequences and rewards of their actions was perhaps the most
predominant finding. Moral integrity was chosen to ultimately serve the self-interest of
being a part of a higher purpose. Identification with a higher purpose gave meaning and
legitimacy to the women’s moral action. Additionally moral integrity was found to be
innately and enduringly satisfying because it met the women’s inner need for a
connection with something higher than themselves. Ironically, the mantra of present-day
culture to seek self-fulfillment by looking inward was, in this study, the pathway to regret
and loss of self-respect. A representation of the analysis as interpreted by the researcher
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was presented in a Moral Juncture Model of Self. The model, which centers on the
protection of self-interests, was expounded upon as it integrates the self in a moral
dilemma, the beliefs about morality, the connection with a higher purpose, and the
proximity of rewards and consequences to self.
Sixteen women volunteered to share the details of their lives in this study so that
others might learn and grow from their moral successes or failures. The depths of
emotion filling their stories with deep regret or enduring peace indicate their agreement
with the sentiment at the end of Robert Frost’s (1920) poem, “The Road Not Taken”:
“Two roads diverged in a wood, and I I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.”
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Appendix A: Interview Guide
Title: Pro-Life Women Faced with an Unwanted Pregnancy
Setting: Determine location that is comfortable, safe for the interviewee. Ask her to bring
along any journals/diaries/writings concerning thoughts about and experiences during the
unwanted pregnancy.
1. Introduction:
(a) Introduce self
(b) Request permission to record – turn on recorder
(c) Review/sign Informed Consent – highlight voluntary nature and contact
researcher’s information
(d) Take Demographic Questionnaire information
(e) Provide a list of post-abortion counseling contact information/counselors in the
local area who have agreed to accept referrals from the current study
(f) Collect diaries or journals of timeframe to make copies
(g) Provide information about number of questions (approx. 30 – one to two hours),
organization of interview guide and types of questions (researcher seeks to know
about you and your experiences with this pregnancy – questions will begin
general and will become more specific)
(h) Questions?
2. Screening:
(a) What was your age when you discovered you were pregnant? (must be 20 y/o or
more to be included)
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(b) What was your living situation? (must have 2 years or more of financial
independence from parents to be included)
(c) Prior to the pregnancy, how would you have described your stance on abortion?
[Must:(a) view the fetus as a person who is alive, (b) consider abortion as the
taking of a life, and (c) think abortion justifiable only if the actual physical life of
the mother is threatened by the continued pregnancy to be included]
(d) Tell me about the circumstances surrounding your pregnancy and your feelings
about it. (If aborted – assume unwanted; if aborted to save life of mother – will
not be included; if carried to term – must be unmarried and unwanted to be
included)
3. Demographic questionnaire(Appendix C)
4. Tell me a little bit about yourself.
(a) Family
(b) Work
(c) Daily Life
5. If you were to describe yourself to me what would you say? Who are you?
(a) What things matter most to you?
(b) Tell me how significant parts of your upbringing made you who you are today.
6. Go back to just prior to your pregnancy and describe yourself to me. Who were you
then?
(a) What mattered most to you then?
(b) What were your goals?
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7. Tell me what it was like for you when you found out you were pregnant.
(a) Thoughts
(b) Emotions
(c) What did you fear the most?
8. Did becoming pregnant change the way you thought about yourself?
(a) How so?
9. What options did you consider in the pregnancy?
(a) With whom did you consult?
10. How did you make your decision to (abort/carry)?
(a) What were your goals or motivation?
(b) What mattered most to you then?
11. Was there a right thing to do in this situation?
(a) Tell me how responsible you felt for doing the right thing.
(b) Tell me about your feelings as to whether you were capable to do what you
thought was the right thing.
12. Tell me about your emotions following your decision.
(a) Did you feel positive/negative, conflicted/peaceful, eager/avoidant?
(b) How did you feel about yourself in the decision?
13. If you had it to do all over again what would you do?
(a) Why?
(b) What would you say to someone in an unwanted pregnancy?
14. Did this interview change your thoughts or feelings in any way?
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15. That is all of the questions that I have for you. Is there anything that you would like to
ask me?
16. Post Interview Activities:
(a) Remind participants that they have a list of counselors in the local area who have
agreed to accept referrals from the current study
(b) Provide contact information and invite participants to call or e-mail with
additional thoughts or concerns
(c) Thank participants for time and valuable insights
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Appendix B: Informed Consent
Pro-Life Women Faced with an Unwanted Pregnancy
Patti McCarthy Broderick, Doctoral Candidate
Liberty University
Center for Counseling and Family Studies
You are invited to be a part of a research study investigating the experiences of pro-life
women who have been faced with an unwanted pregnancy. You were selected as a
possible participant in this study because you were identified as being pro-life, over 20
years of age and financially independent from your parents when you discovered your
pregnancy. Please read this form in its entirety and ask any questions you may have
before agreeing to be in the study.
This research study is being conducted by Patti McCarthy Broderick to fulfill one of her
requirements for earning a Ph.D. in Professional Counseling from Liberty University,
Lynchburg, Virginia.
Background Information
The purpose of this study is to gain insight into the actual experiences of pro-life women
who have faced an unwanted pregnancy and to understand what factors went into their
decisions to abort or to carry their pregnancies to term.
Procedures
If you agree to be a part of this study, your participation will involve a private,
confidential interview with the researcher that will last approximately one and one-half to
two hours. Additionally, you are encouraged to provide any journals, diaries or other
writings that may enlighten the researcher about your beliefs about unwanted
pregnancies, and your thoughts and feelings as you journeyed through your own
unwanted pregnancy. No more than two follow-up interviews may be conducted that will
last no more than one hour in order to clarify and validate information gathered during
the first interview. All interviews will be recorded and transcribed verbatim for a more
thorough analysis of their content.
Risks and Benefits of being in the Study
Psychological risks exist. Consequently, discomfort may be experienced as a result of
participating in this study. These may include, but are not limited to (a) emotional/
psychological stress generated from the question content or the memories generated by
the questioning, (b) the possibility of becoming fatigued during the interviewing process
or as a result of the interview and the emotions generated from it, and (c) revelation of
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personal issues of sufficient depth and meaning to cause emotional pain during and
following the interview.
Benefits of participation in this study include the opportunity to look introspectively
through the interview questions, the chance to describe your own experience to help
social scientists understand what it was like for you, and the opportunity to share with
others what you have learned from your experiences.
Mental Stress
Following the interview, a referral list of willing local counselors who have agreed to see
participants of this study will be provided to you. Liberty University will not provide
treatment or financial compensation if you become mentally stressed as a result of
participating in this research project. This does not waive any of your legal rights nor
release any claim you might have based on negligence.
Confidentiality
The information you provide during this and any subsequent interviews will be kept
private. Transcriptions will be conducted by a professional transcriptionist who is
ethically required to maintain confidentiality. The transcriptionist will never see the
demographic information. Digital tapes will be maintained until the transcriptions are
verified by the researcher, when they will be erased.
All interviewees will be given fake names and any specific identifying information
discussed during the interview will not be included in the final report to protect your
identity. These fake names and identifying information will be seen only by the
researcher and will be kept secure in separate locations of the researchers’ home.
Upon completion of this study, the researcher will contact you to discuss the results and
provide you with a copy, if desired. The results of this study could be published in
professional journals, books and articles.
Voluntary Nature of the Study
Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. You may withdraw from the study at
any time. If an interview has already been conducted, your individual responses may be
removed from the study prior to publication by contacting the researcher at the number
provided on the following page. Should you become fatigued at any time during this
interview, a 10-15 minute break will be taken from the interview to allow you to
determine if you desire or are able to continue. Should issues of emotional distress or
functional difficulty arise as a result of this interview, please contact the researcher.
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Contacts and Questions:
Please direct questions regarding your participation in this research study, participants’
rights or on issues relating to participation in this research study to the researcher by email at pmbroderick@liberty.edu or by calling (703) 737-7353. The Liberty University
Institutional Review Board, an objective group of representatives from Liberty University
who are responsible for the ethical treatment of the participants of research conducted at
the university, may be contacted at IRB@Liberty.edu or by writing the Institutional
Review Board, Liberty University, 1971 University Blvd., Campus North, Suite 2400U,
Lynchburg VA 24501. If you have concerns about how you were treated by the
researcher, please feel free to contact them.
Statement of Consent
By signing below, you voluntarily consent to participate in this study and acknowledge
you understand and voluntarily agree to: (a) the potential risks to yourself and (b) the
manner in which the information you provide this study will be gathered, stored, and
used. Your signature is required on both identical copies of the consent forms. One copy
is to be kept by you for your records and one will be retained by the researcher for the
research records.
Participant Signature_____________________________________________
Printed Name___________________________________________________
Date__________________________________________________________

Researcher Signature_____________________________________________
Printed Name___________________________________________________
Date___________________________________________________________
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Appendix C: Demographic Questionnaire
Your Name______________________________(first name only)
State of Residence ______________________
How can I contact you?
Phone Number_______________ Can I use this?_____ (yes/no)
E-mail______________________ Can I use this?_____ (yes/no)
I will wait for you to contact me only______ (please do!)
Information about you now:
Age:_____
Race:_________________________
Religion:______________________
Marital Status:_______________________
Occupation:____________________
Education Level Attained:___________________________
Number of Children:_____
Total Number of Previous Pregnancies:_____
Total Number Aborted:_____
Total Number Delivered:_____
Total Number Miscarried:_____
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